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UNRAVELLING THE CONFUSED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TREATY OBLIGATIONS 
TO EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE AND “UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION” IN THE LIGHT OF 
THE HABRÉ CASE 
By Matthew Garrod 
The Habré case marks the second contentious case in which the International Court of 
Justice (“ICJ”) has had the opportunity to clarify universal criminal jurisdiction in international 
law.1 On the first occasion, in the Arrest Warrant case, the ICJ declined the opportunity to 
discuss the legality of universal jurisdiction.2 In Habré, the ICJ decided on the obligation to 
extradite or prosecute for the first time and referred to the prescriptive jurisdiction arising out of 
this obligation in Article 5(2) of the 1984 United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”) as “universal jurisdiction.”3 
This article uses a wide range of primary sources to bring new insight and much needed 
conceptual and legal clarification on the meaning of “universal jurisdiction” and its relationship 
between jurisdiction in treaty obligations to extradite or prosecute. In turn, it aims to inform the 
work on universal jurisdiction at the UN General Assembly and its Sixth Committee and assist 
states and courts in the implementation of their treaty obligations to extradite or prosecute, 
thereby preventing disputes.4 Its central argument is that treaty obligations to extradite or 
                                                 
 Department of Law, University of Sussex, U.K. (m.garrod@sussex.ac.uk). The author would like to thank 
Professors Christian Henderson, José Alvarez and Benedict Kingsbury, Sarah Garrod, Jenny Wue, Mike Donohue, 
and the anonymous reviewers for their feedback on earlier drafts. The views in the present article are those of the 
author alone and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the UN. 
1 Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.), 2012 I.C.J. REP. 32 (Jul. 20) 
(“Judgment” or “Habré case”). 
2 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. REP. 3 (Feb. 14) (“Arrest Warrant”). 
The ICJ determined this case by “assuming” that Belgium had jurisdiction under international law to issue and 
circulate an arrest warrant in respect of the then Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DRC, thereby deciding to focus 
solely on the question of immunities under international law. This was on the basis that the DRC in its final 
submissions had dropped its challenge to the legality of Belgium’s claim to exercise universal jurisdiction and relied 
exclusively on the alleged violation of diplomatic immunity, id., para. 46. The ICJ’s decision in this regard was 
criticized in the Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins et al., who were of the opinion that “it was not only 
desirable, but indeed necessary, that the Court should have stated its position on this issue of jurisdiction”, id., para. 
3. See further Part V, notes 295-97. 
3 Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 UNTS 85; Judgment, supra note 1, paras. 74-75, 84, 91, 118.  
4 The Sixth Committee is the primary UN forum for the consideration of legal questions in the General Assembly. 
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prosecute should not be conceptualized as, or used to infer the existence of, universal 
jurisdiction.5 Rather, the type of jurisdiction arising out of these obligations, it is proposed, is 
more accurately termed “treaty-based jurisdiction,” which is antithetical to universal jurisdiction 
and at variance with its underlying rationale.6  
In making this argument, this article provides three main sources of insight. First, it 
argues that the references to “universal jurisdiction” in the Habré case amount to little more than 
obiter dictum and do not support universal jurisdiction’s existence in customary international law 
or its relationship, if any at all, to treaty obligations to extradite or prosecute. Second, it analyzes 
the text of Articles 5 and 7 of the CAT and their travaux préparatoires, both of which are 
bypassed by the ICJ, to show that jurisdiction in treaty obligations to extradite or prosecute is 
incapable of giving rise to universal jurisdiction. Lastly, it presents the findings of an original 
empirical analysis of state practice since the end of World War II to the present, including actual 
prosecutions purporting to be based on universal jurisdiction, to show that universal jurisdiction 
does not exist under customary international law at present and that common examples of 
universal jurisdiction state practice are actually different types of treaty-based jurisdiction.  
The argument advanced in this article finds support in emerging scholarship7 and has 
been adopted in a study on universal jurisdiction recently published by the European Parliament, 
                                                 
5 This article analyzes universal jurisdiction only in criminal cases. It not intended to challenge the extent to which 
universal jurisdiction exists and over what crimes in current customary international law. Nor is it concerned with 
proposing a definition of universal jurisdiction.  
6 The term “treaty-based jurisdiction” is borrowed from Arrest Warrant, supra note 2, para. 41 (Higgins et al., JJ., 
joint sep. op.); U.S. v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2003); Special Rapporteur, Second report on crimes against 
humanity, para. 113, UN Doc. A/CN.4/690 (2016). 
7 Rosalyn Higgins, International Law and the Avoidance, Containment and Resolution of Disputes, 230 RECUEIL 
DES COURS 9, 98-99 (1991 V); Luc Reydams, The Rise and Fall of Universal Jurisdiction, 14-26 (2010), at 
www.ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/publications/working_papers/new_series/wp31-40/wp37.pdf; Sienho Yee, Universal 
Jurisdiction: Concept, Logic, and Reality, 10 CHINESE JIL 504 (2011). 
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following the submission of evidence by the present author.8 It also builds on the present 
author’s previously published research on universal jurisdiction’s alleged historical legal 
sources9 and current role as an independent expert legal advisor at the UN on counter terrorism 
law, including treaty obligations to extradite or prosecute.  
Clarification of the relationship between treaty obligations to extradite or prosecute and 
universal jurisdiction, especially in the light of the Habré case, is timely and important for the 
following reasons. First, since the 1980s there has emerged an (unproven) prevailing narrative in 
scholarship, research institutes, nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”), and the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”) that treaty obligations to extradite or prosecute impliedly 
embody and even mandate universal jurisdiction.10 This argument is gaining ground following 
the Habré case. For example, leading scholars increasingly discuss this case as if the ICJ were 
affirming the existence of universal jurisdiction and providing meaningful guidance on its 
relationship with the obligation to extradite or prosecute.11 Perhaps more important, in 2014 the 
International Law Commission (“ILC”) adopted a “Final Report” on treaty obligations to 
                                                 
8 Luc Reydams, The application of universal jurisdiction in the fight against impunity, European Parliament, 10-13 
(Mar. 14, 2016), at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2016/578000/EXPO_IDA(2016)578000_EN.pdf. The present 
author submitted oral and written evidence to this study during interviews (on file with author). The study was 
requested by the Parliament of the European Union in order to “feed” in to the debate on universal jurisdiction at the 
UN General Assembly and help it form opinion and make decisions in this respect.  
9 Matthew Garrod, The Development of Protective Principle Jurisdiction over War Crimes and the Hollow Concept 
of Universality, 12 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 763 (2012); Matthew Garrod, Piracy, the Protection of Vital State 
Interests and the False Foundations of Universal Jurisdiction in International Law, 25 DIPLOMACY & 
STATECRAFT 195 (2014); Matthew Garrod, The British Influence on the Development of the Laws of War and the 
Punishment of War Criminals: From the Grotius Society to the United Nations War Crimes Commission, in 
BRITISH INFLUENCES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1915-2015 (Robert McCorquodale & Jean-Pierre Gauci 
eds., 2016).  
10 For the starting point of this increasingly intensive scholarly debate on the matter, see Kenneth Randall, Universal 
Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785 (1988). See further Part I, notes 50-55.  
11 See, e.g., Mads Andenas & Thomas Weatherall, International Court of Justice: Questions Relating to the 
Obligations to Extradite or Prosecute (Belgium v Senegal) Judgment of 20 July 2012, 62 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 753 
(2013); Máximo Langer, Universal Jurisdiction is Not Disappearing. The Shift from ‘Global Enforcer’ to ‘No Safe 
Haven’ Universal Jurisdiction, 13 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 245, 251 (2015); RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES JURISDICTION, Tentative Draft No. 2, §217, cmt. c 
& Reporters’ Note 2 (2016). 
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extradite or prosecute stating, in reliance on the judgment in the Habré case, that the “necessary 
jurisdiction,” in the implementation of such obligations, “would necessarily reflect an exercise of 
universal jurisdiction.”12  
Second, the topic of universal jurisdiction was elevated to the UN General Assembly and 
its Sixth Committee in 2009, at the request of the African Union (“AU”), following a conflict 
concerning the AU accusing certain European states of abusing this jurisdiction by selectively 
targeting leaders from the continent for politically motivated prosecutions.13 The conflict 
generated between Africa and Europe over universal jurisdiction is more widespread than 
regional differences and is ongoing. Work on this topic has made little progress during the past 
seven years and delegations are presently unable to agree on how to move the topic forward.14 
The primary reason for this impasse is due to considerable confusion between universal 
jurisdiction and treaty obligations to extradite or prosecute. On one hand, several delegations 
evidence universal jurisdiction’s existence by referring to extradite or prosecute obligations.15 As 
extradite or prosecute obligations are contained in more than sixty treaties, including numerous 
treaties and legally binding UN Security Council resolutions relating to acts of “terrorism,”16 the 
                                                 
12 Report of the ILC on the Work of Its Sixty-Sixth Session, UN GAOR, 69th Sess., Supp. No. 10, paras. 145, 147, 
UN Doc A/69/10 (2014). The ILC was established by the UN General Assembly in 1947 to promote the progressive 
development of international law and its codification. See Statute of the International Law Commission 1947, 
annexed to A/RES/174 (II) (Nov. 21, 1947) (as amended). 
13 See Assembly of the AU, Decision on the Report of the Commission on the Abuse of the Principle of Universal 
Jurisdiction, Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.199 (XI) (Jul. 1, 2008); Letter Dated 21 January 2009 from the Permanent 
Representative of Tanzania to the UN addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/63/237 (Feb. 3, 2009); Letter 
Dated 29 June 2009 from the Permanent Representative of Tanzania to the UN addressed to the UN secretary-
general, UN Doc. A/63/237/Rev.1 (Jul. 23, 2009). 
14 Press Release, Speakers in Sixth Committee Agree on Need to Advance Discussion of Universal Jurisdiction, 
While Differing over Principle’s Application, Scope, Sixth Committee, 71st Sess., 14th Mtg. (13 Oct. 2016), at 
https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/gal3525.doc.htm.  
15 E.g., UN secretary-general report, The Scope and Application of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, paras. 14, 
18, 22, 36, 38-39, UN Doc. A/67/116 (2012) (“secretary-general report (2012)”); UN secretary-general report, The 
Scope and Application of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, paras. 11, 16, 21-22, 31, 37, 64, 74-75, UN Doc. 
A/70/125 (2015) (“secretary-general report (2015)”).  
16 There is currently no internationally agreed or comprehensive definition of “terrorism,” which has been the 
subject of negotiations at the UN since 2000 and is available online at http://legal.un.org/committees/terrorism/ 
(visited June. 22, 2017). Nonetheless, the extradite or prosecute obligation is contained in numerous international 
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Habré case is leading to further positive statements about universal jurisdiction’s application 
over a potentially voluminous list of crimes.17 On the other, a considerable number of 
delegations caution that extradite or prosecute obligations, despite having the purpose of 
preventing impunity, is conceptually and legally distinct from universal jurisdiction proper.18 As 
a result, a Working Group, established by the Sixth Committee to undertake a “thorough 
discussion” of universal jurisdiction, has identified a non-exhaustive list of twelve crimes, not all 
of which are crimes under international law, in acknowledging support among some delegations 
for “treaty-based forms of universal jurisdiction.”19  
The article concludes that universal jurisdiction is, at present, a hollow concept without 
state practice, which is in urgent need of substantial revision and more accurate definition. This 
requires recognition that treaty obligations to extradite or prosecute do not provide a legal source 
of “universal jurisdiction” and that characterizing these obligations as such is conceptually 
confused and inconsistent with actual state practice. Unilateral assertions of universal jurisdiction 
should be avoided until the basic concept is clarified and its existence in custom is established by 
states. The risk is that excessive—and unlawful—claims of jurisdiction (including over nationals 
                                                 
and regional counter terrorism instruments and Security Council resolutions; e.g., International Convention for the 
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Dec. 15, 1997, 2149 UNTS 256, Art. 6 (“Terrorist Bombings Convention”); 
S/RES/1373 (2001), para. 2(e) (Sep. 28, 2001). 
17 E.g., UN GAOR, 69th Sess., 12th mtg., para. 21 (Belarus), UN Doc. A/C.6/69/SR.12 (Oct. 15, 2014); UN GAOR, 
70th Sess., 12th mtg., paras. 57 (Switzerland), 78 (Poland), UN Doc. A/C.6/70/SR.12 (Oct. 20, 2015). See also the 
following report, prepared for the purpose of informing Sixth Committee discussions: Amnesty International, 
Universal Jurisdiction: Strengthening this Essential Tool of International Justice 25, AI Index IOR 53/020/2012, 
Oct. 2012. For a contrary view of the Habré case, see Statement by Permanent Mission of India to the UN, The 
Scope and Application of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction (Oct. 15, 2014), at 
http://statements.unmeetings.org/media2/4653143/india-en.pdf. 
18 E.g., UN secretary-general report, The Scope and Application of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, para. 15, 
UN Doc. A/65/181 (2010) (“secretary-general report (2010)”); secretary-general report (2012), supra note 15, para. 
41. 
19 These crimes are apartheid, corruption, crimes against humanity, crime of aggression, enforced disappearances, 
genocide, piracy, slavery, terrorism, torture, transnational organized crime and war crimes. See Working Group 
Chair Informal Working Paper (Nov. 7, 2014), at https://papersmart.unmeetings.org/media2/4655216/roadmap-
en.pdf; UN GAOR, 71st Sess., 31st mtg., para. 26 (Working Group Chair), UN Doc. A/C.6/71/SR.31 (Dec. 2, 
2016). 
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of non-state parties to the relevant treaties), breaching other rules of international law and 
causing further tension and disputes, could result. 
I. THE CONCEPT AND INTERPRETATION OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION PRE- HABRÉ 
A. Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction and the Burden of Proof 
It is useful at the outset of the analysis to explain the meaning of universal jurisdiction, as 
it is commonly understood in scholarship and the work of research institutes and NGOs, in order 
to distinguish it from the obligation to extradite or prosecute. Generally, states are prohibited 
from legislating on criminal matters outside their territory unless international law provides for 
an explicit permission.20 Of decisive importance is the burden of proof.21 The state that asserts 
the applicability of its domestic law beyond its territory bears the burden of proving that it is 
permitted by one of the grounds of prescriptive jurisdiction accepted under customary 
international law.22 There is presently no multi-lateral treaty codifying and defining these 
grounds of prescriptive jurisdiction, although since the early twentieth century they have been 
defined lex ferenda in scholarship and the work of research institutes, such as the American Law 
Institute, as including principles of territoriality, nationality, and protective jurisdiction.23 Such 
proof of a link with the prescribing state serves to prevent unlawful interference in the 
                                                 
20 S.S. “Lotus” (Fra. v. Turk.), 1927 PCIJ (Ser. A) No. 10 (Sep. 7); Arrest Warrant, supra note 2, para. 4 (Guillaume, 
J., sep. op.); Report of the ILC on the Work of Its Fifty-Eighth Session, UN GAOR, 58th Sess., Supp. No. 10, annex 
E, paras. 8-9, UN Doc. A/61/10 (2006); RESTATEMENT (FOURTH), supra note 11, §211. 
21 The link relied on to ground prescriptive jurisdiction over given conduct must exist at the time at which the 
conduct is performed.  
22 It is axiomatic that jurisdiction may also be established by treaty.  
23 Research in International Law Under the Auspices of the Faculty of the Harvard Law School, Jurisdiction with 
Respect to Crime, 29 AJIL (SUPP) 437 (1935). For a fuller consideration of internationally acceptable grounds of 
prescriptive criminal jurisdiction, see UN Doc. A/61/10, supra note 20, paras. 10-21; Frederick A. Mann, The 
Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law, 111 R.C.A.D.I. 1 (1964); International Bar Association Legal Practice 
Division, Report of the Task Force on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 141-161 (Sep. 28, 2008), at 
http://www.ibanet.org/Publications/ 
publications_IBA_guides_and_free_materials.aspx; RESTATEMENT (FOURTH), supra note 11, §§212-17. 
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sovereignty and domestic affairs of other states.24 This may be contrasted with the principle of 
universal jurisdiction, the most controversial ground of jurisdiction, which does not require the 
prescribing state to prove any link to its territory, nationals or national interests when exercised.  
B. Definition the Universal Jurisdiction Concept 
There is currently no agreed definition of universal jurisdiction among states. However, 
scholars, research institutes and several states usually define universal jurisdiction as the 
“absence” of normal jurisdictional links to the prescribing state.25 For example, the Institute of 
International Law in its resolution on universal jurisdiction provides that:  
Universal jurisdiction in criminal matters, as an additional ground 
of jurisdiction, means the competence of a State to prosecute alleged 
offenders and to punish them if convicted, irrespective of the place 
of commission of the crime and regardless of any link of active or 
passive nationality, or other grounds of jurisdiction recognized by 
international law.26 
The absence of proof of a prescriptive link is justified by universal jurisdiction’s 
underlying rationale, which transcends the interests of states. First, the grave or heinous nature of 
certain crimes under international law, such as piracy and war crimes, is widely believed to be at 
universal jurisdiction’s “core.”27 Second, because such crimes are so serious, preventing the 
impunity of them is a concern of every state. As such, states acting on the basis of universal 
                                                 
24 Christian Tomuschat (Rapporteur), Universal Criminal Jurisdiction With Respect to the Crime of Genocide, 
Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes, 71(I) YEARBOOK OF INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
213, 219-20 (2005).  
25 E.g., secretary-general report (2010), supra note 18, at 5, Council of the European Union, AU-EU Technical ad 
hoc Expert Group, Report on the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, para. 8, Doc. 8672/1/09 REV1 (2009) (“AU-
EU report”); Roger O’Keefe, Universal Jurisdiction. Clarifying the Basic Concept, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 735, 
740, 745 (2004); The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction 23, 43 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2001), at 
www.lapa.princeton.edu/hosteddocs/unive_jur.pdf; Yee, supra note 7, para. 3.  
26 Institute of International Law, Resolution on Universal Criminal Jurisdiction with Regard to the Crime of 
Genocide, War Crimes, and Crimes Against Humanity, para. 1 (2005), at http://www.idi-
iil.org/idiF/resolutionsF/2005_kra_03_fr.pdf (“IIL”). See also RESTATEMENT (FOURTH), supra note 11, §217. 
27 UN GAOR, 69th Sess., 28th mtg., para. 31 (Working Group Chair), Working Group Chair Informal Working 
Paper, supra note 19. See also Higgins, supra note 7, at 90; Princeton Principles, supra note 25, at 23, 28; Randall, 
supra note 10, at 788; Tomuschat, supra note 24, at 225.  
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jurisdiction do so as “agents of the international community” to protect exclusively international 
community values.28 The types of values that may be protected by universal jurisdiction are 
usually left insufficiently explained or unsubstantiated by courts and in scholarship and need to 
be worked out and agreed upon by states. They are often proposed to include the prevention of 
impunity of heinous crimes and the protection of human rights. The Sixth Committee has so far 
been unable to reach agreement on both the definition of universal jurisdiction and its underlying 
rationale, including the international community values protected, during its work on universal 
jurisdiction.29 
C. Treaty-Based Jurisdiction 
If the unique feature of universal jurisdiction is the absence of any link at all between the 
crime and the prescribing state, then jurisdiction arising out of treaty obligations to extradite or 
prosecute is its antithesis. Since 1929 the extradite or prosecute obligation has been included in 
more than sixty treaties with some complex and varying conditions of extradition or 
prosecution.30 Although treaty-based jurisdiction arises out of all treaties creating extradite or 
prosecute obligations, the main focus of this article is on a particular kind of extradite or 
prosecute provision known as the “Hague formula” and the extradite or prosecute obligation 
formulation contained in the grave breaches provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.31 The 
basis for this focus is that the Hague formula was first included in the 1970 Convention for the 
                                                 
28 Arrest Warrant, supra note 2, paras. 5, 46 (van den Wyngaert, J., diss. op.), 15 (Guillaume, J., sep. op.), 51, 61, 
73, 75 (Higgins et al., JJ., joint sep. op.); Attorney-General for Israel v. Eichmann (S. Ct., May 29, 1962), 36 ILR 
277, 300; Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582-83 (6th Cir. 1985); National Commissioner of the South 
African Police Service v. Southern African Human Rights Litigation Centre (485/2012) [2013] ZASCA 168, para. 
39 (Nov. 27, 2013); secretary-general report (2010), supra note 18, para. 10. 
29 UN Doc. A/C.6/71/SR.31, supra note 19. 
30 For a description of a proposed typology of provisions containing extradite or prosecute obligations in treaties, see  
Secretariat, Survey of multilateral conventions which may be of relevance for the work of the ILC on the topic “The 
obligation to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare),” para. 91, UN Doc. A/CN.4/630 (2010) (“secretariat 
survey”).   
31 Id., para. 90.  
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Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft32 and is “unanimously acknowledged” as having 
served as a model for most of the contemporary criminal law conventions.33 As such, this 
provision has been used in numerous international and regional treaties aimed at the suppression 
of specific offenses, principally in the field of countering terrorism,34 but also in many other 
diverse areas, including torture,35 mercenaries,36 safety of UN personnel,37 transnational 
organized crime,38 corruption39 and forced disappearances.40 The 1949 Geneva Conventions are 
claimed by leading scholars as the “first treaty-based embodiment” of mandatory universal 
jurisdiction and influenced the subsequent adoption of universal jurisdiction in criminal law 
conventions (including conventions containing the Hague formula) since the 1970s.41    
A treaty-based obligation to extradite or prosecute requires a state party to establish its 
jurisdiction over a relevant offense—for example, torture, in the case of the CAT—when an 
alleged offender is present in the state’s territory (“Custodial State”) and either prosecute him or 
extradite him to a party with a link to the offense.42 The common wording used in treaties that 
use the Hague formula, including in the text of the CAT, describes the treaty-based jurisdiction 
of a Custodial State in the following terms: each contracting state “shall . . . take such measures 
as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offense in the case where the alleged 
                                                 
32 Dec. 16, 1970, 860 UNTS 105 (“Seizure of Aircraft Convention”). 
33 Secretariat survey, supra note 30, paras. 90-91, 113. For a list of treaties containing the Hague formula, see id., 
para. 108.  
34 E.g., International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999, 2178 UNTS 197 
(“Financing Convention”). 
35 Supra note 3. 
36 International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, Dec. 4, 1989, 
2163 UNTS 75. 
37 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, Dec. 9, 1994, 2051 UNTS 363. 
38 Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, Nov. 15, 2000, 2225 UNTS 209. 
39 Convention against Corruption, Oct. 31, 2003, 2349 UNTS 41. 
40 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, Dec. 20, 2006, 2716, 
UNTS 3. 
41 Roger O’Keefe, The Grave Breaches Regime and Universal Jurisdiction, 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 811, 811, 825-
26 (2009). 
42 Supra note 3, Art. 5(2).   
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offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite him . . . to any of the States mentioned 
in paragraph 1”.43 
The states “mentioned in Paragraph 1” (“Paragraph 1 States”) have important links with a 
relevant offense. These links are often specified in provisions used in parallel to extradite or 
prosecute obligations, in particular where a state party’s nationals or national vital interests are 
implicated by an offense.44 For example, the Terrorist Bombings Convention permits states 
parties to establish their jurisdiction over a relevant offense when committed against the state’s 
nationals, the state’s property abroad (including an embassy or other diplomatic or consular 
premises), aircraft operated by the government, or if an offense is committed in an attempt to 
compel the state to do or abstain from doing any act (thereby threatening the state’s sovereignty, 
independence and governmental functions).45 Therefore, jurisdiction derived from treaty 
obligations to extradite or prosecute has a treaty basis in international law and accordingly 
creates important links with one or more of the parties to the relevant treaty regime.  
D. Universal Jurisdiction’s False Historical Foundations and Hollow Concept 
The most important reason for clearly distinguishing between universal jurisdiction and 
jurisdiction arising out of treaty obligations to extradite or prosecute is because the former is 
based on false historical foundations and is a hollow concept. This article is not the place to 
examine universal jurisdiction’s historical origins, which has been examined in-depth by the 
present author elsewhere.46 It suffices to say that, contrary to common belief, there is no 
historical evidence to support the existence of a customary rule of universal jurisdiction over 
                                                 
43 Id.  
44 The state’s national vital interests include sovereignty, political independence, security, diplomatic personnel and 
premises, embassies, and government facilities abroad. See further Part V, notes 285-92. 
45 Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 16, Art. 6. 
46 Garrod (2012), supra note 9; Garrod (2014), supra note 9. 
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piracy and war crimes. Consequently, universal jurisdiction has no historical foundations in 
customary international law and is a hollow concept.47  This finding has important implications 
for the extent of the existence of universal jurisdiction in customary international law as its 
stands today. Indeed, a detailed empirical analysis of state practice from the end of World War II 
to the present confirms that universal jurisdiction remains a concept without state practice.48 
Recent scholarship and case law also shows that the heinous nature of piracy has nothing to do 
with universal jurisdiction and is therefore incapable of providing a rationale for it; and by 
extension, it does not provide a valid precedent for universal jurisdiction over crimes other than 
piracy.49 The uncertain and controversial status of universal jurisdiction in customary 
international law would suggest that a cautious approach is needed when reading treaty 
obligations to extradite or prosecute as either permitting or mandating universal jurisdiction. 
1. Unproven Prevailing Narrative  
However, since the 1980s there has developed an (unproven) prevailing narrative in 
scholarship that universal jurisdiction has “long and honorable” historical roots under customary 
international law in respect of piracy and war crimes, which can be analogized with jurisdiction 
contained in modern treaty obligations to extradite or prosecute.50 The basis for this analogy is 
                                                 
47 Id. For what it is worth, this finding has been adopted by the study on universal jurisdiction published by the 
European Parliament; see Reydams, supra note 8, at 7-8. On the issue of piracy, see Harry Gould, Cicero’s Ghost. 
Rethinking the Social Construction of Piracy, in MARITIME PIRACY AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Michael J. Struett, Jon D. Carlson & Mark T. Nance eds., 2013); Tamsin Paige, Piracy 
and Universal Jurisdiction, 12 MACQUARIE LJ 131 (2013); Reydams, supra note 7, at 10-13; Alfred P. Rubin, 
The Law of Piracy (1998). 
48 Part IV, notes 258-83. 
49 U.S. v. Hasan, 747 F.Supp.2d 599, 611 (E.D. Va. 2010); Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern 
Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow Foundations, 45 HARVARD INT’L L. J. 183, 184-86 (2004); Paige, supra note 47, 
at 135. 
50 David Stewart, Some Perspectives on Universal Jurisdiction, 102 AM. SOC’Y INT’L PROC. 397, 404 (2008). 
See also Máximo Langer, The Diplomacy of Universal Jurisdiction: The Political Branches and the Transnational 
Prosecution of International Crimes, 105 AJIL 1, 3 (2011); O’Keefe, supra note 25, at 755-56; Princeton Principles, 
supra 25, at 45-48; Randall, supra note 10, at 788-89, 791-97, 801-10, 815-21; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §404 (1987); Michael P. Scharf, Jurisdiction with 
Respect to Crime: Universal Jurisdiction and the Harvard Research, in THE HARVARD RESEARCH IN 
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two separate, interrelated grounds. First, the prescriptive jurisdiction arising out of treaty 
obligations to extradite or prosecute is not based on any recognized jurisdictional link with an 
offense at issue.51 Therefore, treaties themselves, by analogy, impliedly embody and even 
mandate the use of universal jurisdiction.52 Second, universal jurisdiction developed over piracy 
and war crimes because they are ‘heinous’. Therefore, universal jurisdiction may be expanded 
unilaterally by states to other crimes of an equally heinous nature, including crimes contained in 
treaties and regardless of their actual text.53 The heinous nature of crimes thus becomes the sole 
criterion for deciding whether or not universal jurisdiction exists over a particular crime. The 
analogy was alluded to by Judges Higgins et al. in the Arrest Warrant case.54 The judges state 
that it is “necessary that universal criminal jurisdiction be exercised only over those crimes 
regarded as the most heinous by the international community. Piracy is the classical example.”55 
The judges propose obiter dictum that treaties which contain extradite or prosecute obligations 
“opens the door to a jurisdiction based on the heinous nature of the crime,” which they referred 
to as “perhaps a treaty-based provision for universal jurisdiction.”56 The prevailing narrative is 
increasingly subject to question, which appears to have developed out of “a persistent reliance 
upon tentative secondary sources or the use of primary sources wholly out of context.”57   
                                                 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONTEMPORARY ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL 276-85 (John P. Grant & J. Craig 
Barker eds., 2007); Tomuschat, supra note 24, at 215-16.  
51 Id. See further Part III, notes 124-139.  
52 Id. 
53 The result of this view is manifestly absurd because states could simply override carefully negotiated treaty texts 
that either provide for extradite or prosecute obligations or make no provision for extraterritorial jurisdiction at all, 
such as the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 UNTS 277. It 
is also based on a misreading of the obiter dictum in the Lotus case, supra note 20, at 19. 
54 See also Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann (Dist. Ct., Dec. 12, 1961), 36 ILR 5, 26; Eichmann (S. Ct.) supra 
note 28, at 290-300; Polyukhovich v. The Commonwealth of Australia and Another, 172 CLR 501, paras. 32-38 
(1991) (Brennan, J.); Prosecutor v. Furundz̆ija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, paras. 147-56 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
For the Former Yugoslavia, Dec. 10, 1998).  
55 Arrest Warrant, supra note 2, paras. 60-61 (Higgins et al., JJ., sep. op.).  
56 Id., paras. 46, 61. 
57 Garrod (2014), supra note 9, at 199; Reydams, supra note 8, at 8.  
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E. The Habré Case as Evidence for the Existence of Universal Jurisdiction 
Although the prevailing narrative is not new, it has been reinvigorated in response to the 
Habré case, with scholars and NGOs (the ILC and several delegations at the Sixth Committee) 
interpreting the ICJ’s judgment as representing a broad call for universal jurisdiction.58 For 
example, Professor Koutroulis suggests that the ICJ confirms the obligation to establish universal 
jurisdiction for crimes under the CAT59 Professors Andenas and Weatherall go much further, 
arguing that the judgment develops the law of jurisdiction, in particular by “clarifying the 
obligation to extradite or prosecute … [and] that the obligation is premised upon universal 
jurisdiction.”60 According to the authors, the ICJ’s judgment supports the notion that universal 
jurisdiction is “necessary” to fulfill treaty obligations to extradite or prosecute with respect to 
international crimes.61 In a similar vein, Professors Gilbert and Rüsch suggest that the ICJ in the 
Habré case reveals the “overlap” between extradite or prosecute and universal jurisdiction and 
the necessity for states as regards core international crimes to establish universal jurisdiction.62  
Amnesty International also interprets the Habré case as a “landmark” judgment with 
respect to the duty of states to investigate and prosecute crimes under international law based on 
universal jurisdiction.63 Professor O’Keefe goes further still and expands the scope of universal 
jurisdiction beyond the narrow category of crimes under international law to encompass a broad 
                                                 
58 For the impact of the Habré case on the ILC, see Part III.  
59 Vaios Koutroulis, Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal), Max 
Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law (2014).  
60 Andenas & Weatherall, supra note 11, at 753, 768. See also ERROL P MENDES, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW. COMBATTING THE TRAJIC FLAW (2014), chapter 1; 
Thomas Weatherall, Jus Cogens and Sovereign Immunity: Reconciling Divergence in Contemporary Jurisprudence, 
46 GEORGETOWN J. INT’L L. 1151, 1188 (2015). 
61 Id. at 768.  
62 Geoff Gilbert & Anna M Rüsch, Jurisdictional Competence Through Protection. To What Extent Can States 
Prosecute the Prior Crimes of Those to Whom They Have Extended Refuge?, 12 J. INT’L CRIM. J. 1093, 1102 
(2014).  
63 Supra note 17, at 25.  
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range of crimes proscribed in extradite or prosecute regimes. Thus, the Habré case is referenced 
in order to reinforce the argument that, starting with the 1949 Geneva Conventions, universal 
jurisdiction is “mandated by the great majority of the conventions in the field of international 
criminal law.”64  
Similar sentiments have been expressed by some delegations during the work on 
universal jurisdiction at the Sixth Committee, with the Belarusian delegation welcoming the 
ICJ’s judgment for “clarifying aspects of the scope and application of the principle of universal 
jurisdiction”65 and the Polish delegation commenting that the judgment underlines “that the best 
way of giving effect to the principle of aut dedere aut judicare was to prescribe universal 
jurisdiction.”66 
II. ICJ’S JUDGMENT IN THE HABRÉ CASE 
A. Background 
After taking power on 7 June 1982 at the head of a rebellion, Hissène Habré was 
president of Chad for eight years, during which time large-scale violations of human rights were 
allegedly committed in Chad, “including arrests of actual or presumed political opponents, 
detentions without trial or under inhumane conditions, mistreatment, torture, extrajudicial 
executions and enforced disappearances.” 67 The Habré regime was overthrown in 1990 by 
Habré’s former defense and security adviser, Idriss Déby Itno, current president of Chad, and 
                                                 
64 ROGER O’KEEFE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 324, 371, 397 (2015).  
65 UN Doc. A/C.6/69/SR.12, supra note 17. 
66 UN Doc. A/C.6/70/SR.12, supra note 17. 
67 Judgement, supra note 1, para. 1. 
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Habré fled to Senegal where he has lived ever since.68 In 1993, the successive Chadian 
Government removed Habré’s immunity so that Habré could be prosecuted.69  
On 30 November 2000, a Belgian national of Chadian origin filed a civil-party 
application with a Belgian investigating judge against Habré for, “inter alia, serious violations of 
international humanitarian law, crimes of torture and the crime of genocide”.70 Between 30 
November 2000 and 11 December 2001, a further 20 persons, comprising two individuals of dual 
Belgian-Chadian nationality and eighteen Chadians, filed before the same judge for similar 
complaints against Habré. Belgium transmitted an international arrest warrant to Senegal and 
requested the extradition of Habré on 22 September 2005 and, five days later, Interpol issued a 
“red notice” pursuant to Habré’s arrest.71  
The Chambre d’accusation of the Dakar Court of Appeal rejected Belgium’s jurisdiction 
over Habré in a judgment of 25 November 2005, finding that Habré should be granted 
“jurisdictional immunity”, as a former Head of State, “for acts allegedly committed in the 
exercise of his functions”.72 The following day, Senegal referred the matter to the AU.73 The AU 
in a decision of 26 July 2006 decided that the Habré case fell within its competence and 
mandated Senegal to prosecute Habré case “on behalf of Africa”.74 Between March 2011 and 
January 2012, Belgium made three further extradition requests, which were declared 
                                                 
68 Id.; I.C.J., Oral Proceedings, Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.), 11 
(Mar. 19, 2012). 
69 Id., para. 20; Human Rights Watch, Chad Lifts Immunity of Ex-Dictator: Green Light to Prosecute Hissène Habré 
in Belgium (2002), at www.hrw.org/news/2002/12/05/chad-lifts-immunity-ex-dictator. 
70 Id., para. 19. 
71 Id., para. 21. 
72 Id., para. 22. 
73 Id., para. 23.  
74 Id. 
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inadmissible by the Chambre d’accusation of the Dakar Court of Appeal in accordance with 
Senegalese extradition law.75 
In the wake of Pinochet and following a decade of campaigning by human rights 
NGOs,76 Belgium instituted proceedings with the ICJ against Senegal on February 19, 2009 over 
a dispute concerning Senegal’s compliance with its obligations arising under the CAT, as well as 
other obligations under customary international law, to prosecute Habré, or to extradite him to 
Belgium for the purpose of prosecution.77 Notwithstanding the 40,000 murders and acts of 
torture that had been allegedly committed by the Habré regime,78 a handful of the alleged victims 
attaining Belgian nationality is precisely why Belgium (the first state to seek to enforce its rights 
under the CAT before the ICJ) instituted proceedings against Senegal for the latter’s failure to 
either prosecute Habré on Belgium’s behalf or extradite him to Belgium.79 For its part, Senegal 
announced that it would expel Habré to Chad—the state in whose territory the alleged crimes 
had occurred and the only other party to the CAT to express interest in Habré’s prosecution—
“but on no account outside Africa.”80 However, the expulsion decision was suspended following 
a request made by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights that Habré may be tortured and 
executed.81  
                                                 
75 Id., para. 40. 
76 Reydams, supra note 8, at 24-26.  
77 Judgment, supra note 1, para. 1. 
78 Report of National Commission of Inquiry of the Chadian Ministry of Justice, The Crimes and Misappropriations 
Committed by ex-President Habré, his Accomplices and/or Accessories (1992), in Questions Relating to the 
Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.), Application Instituting Proceedings (Feb. 19, 2009). 
79 Judgment, supra note 1, paras. 19-21; id., paras. 21-23 (Sur, J., diss. op.). See also Application, id. at 3, 11, 15; 
Memorial of Belgium, Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite, 1, 11, 4, 13, 44, 52, 56-57, 79-
80, 82 (Jul. 2010) (“Belgium Memorial”); I.C.J., Oral Proceedings, Questions Relating to the Obligation to 
Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.), paras. 3-4, 12-13 (Mar. 12, 2012). 
80 Oral Proceedings, id., para. 40. 
81 Id. Navi Pillay, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (Jul. 10, 2011), at 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=38993&Cr=Chad&Cr1=#.V2v0E_krLIU. 
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One of the most important aspects of the Habré case is the ICJ’s examination of the 
admissibility of Belgium’s claim against Senegal. This is because the way in which the ICJ 
approached admissibility influenced its subsequent interpretation of the CAT’s “object and 
purpose” and the “nature and meaning” of the obligation to extradite or prosecute in Article 7 of 
that instrument. It equally influenced the ICJ’s approach to jurisdiction in Article 5 of the CAT.   
B. Obligations Erga Omnes Partes as a Basis for the Proceedings 
Belgium defended the admissibility of its claim based on a “special interest” with the 
Habré case, the existence of which distinguished “Belgium from the other parties to the 
Convention and gave it a specific entitlement in the case of Mr. Habré.” Thus, Belgium was an 
“injured state” within the meaning of Article 42 of the Articles on State Responsibility and could 
invoke Senegal’s responsibility on this basis.82 The “special interest” was that an investigation 
had been instigated in Belgium at the behest of a “Belgian national of Chadian origin,” a victim 
of the Habré regime, and Belgian courts were permitted “to exercise passive personal 
jurisdiction” by virtue of Article 5(1)(c) of the CAT.83 Belgium had thus “availed itself of its 
right under Article 5 to exercise its jurisdiction and to request extradition.”84 For its part, Senegal 
argued that Belgium was not entitled to invoke the international responsibility of Senegal for the 
alleged breach of its obligation under the CAT as “none of the alleged victims of the acts said to 
be attributable to Mr. Habré was of Belgian nationality at the time when the acts were 
committed.”85 During the proceedings, however, Belgium subsequently defended admissibility 
on a secondary argument: “[u]nder the Convention, every state party, irrespective of the 
                                                 
82 Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Art. 42(b)(i), in Report of the ILC on the Work of Its 
Fifty-Third Session, UN GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001). 
83 Judgment, supra note 1, para. 65. 
84 Id.  
85 Id., para. 64. 
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nationality of the victims, is entitled to claim performance of the obligation concerned, and, 
therefore, can invoke the responsibility resulting from the failure to perform.”86  
The ICJ’s judgment focused solely on Belgium’s second basis of admissibility and held 
that Belgium, as a party to the CAT, had standing to invoke the responsibility of Senegal for the 
alleged breaches of its obligations under Articles 6 and 7 of the CAT.87 The ICJ reasoned that, in 
view of the CAT’s object and purpose, states parties have a “common interest” to ensure that the 
perpetrators of torture do not enjoy impunity.88 On the basis of this “common interest,” the ICJ 
asserted that: 
[t]he obligations of a State party to conduct a preliminary inquiry 
into the facts and to submit the case to its competent authorities for 
prosecution are triggered by the presence of the alleged offender in 
its territory, regardless of the nationality of the offender or the 
victims, or of the place where the alleged offenses occurred. All the 
other States parties have a common interest in compliance with these 
obligations by the State in whose territory the alleged offender is 
present. That common interest implies that the obligations in 
question are owed by any State party to all the other States parties 
to the Convention.89  
According to the ICJ, these obligations under the CAT may be defined as “obligations 
erga omnes partes,” within the meaning of Article 48 of the Articles on State Responsibility, “in 
the sense that each state party has a legal interest in the compliance with them in any given 
case.”90 The “common interest in compliance” with the relevant obligations under the CAT, in 
the ICJ’s opinion, “implies” that each state party is entitled to invoke the responsibility of 
another party for the failure to comply with its obligations erga omnes partes and to bring that 
failure to an end.91 This finding meant that there was “no need” to pronounce on whether 
                                                 
86 Id.   
87 Id., para. 70. 
88 Id., para. 68. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id., para. 69.  
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Belgium has a “special interest” with respect to Senegal’s compliance with the CAT under 
Article 5(1)(c) of the CAT.92  
The ICJ’s decision to focus solely on Belgium’s secondary argument means that there is 
no need for a state party to be specially affected by an alleged breach of the CAT before it may 
be able to invoke the international responsibility of another party and will have standing before 
the ICJ in order to do so. This decision was heavily criticized by the opinions appended to the 
ICJ’s judgment for not reflecting the CAT’s text.93  
C. Implications of Obligations Erga Omnes Partes for Extradite or Prosecute Obligations 
The implications of the ICJ’s reasoning with regard to obligations erga omnes partes for 
extradite or prosecute obligations are twofold.  
1. Protection of a Common Interest  
First, having established that Belgium had standing to bring its claim against Senegal, the 
ICJ’s judgment portrays Belgium as exclusively protecting a “common interest” in the Habré 
case. In the words of the ICJ: “contracting States do not have any interests of their own; they 
merely have, one and all, a common interest.”94 While Belgium requested that the ICJ declare 
that Senegal must, failing prosecution, extradite Habré “to Belgium without further ado,” the ICJ 
ultimately found more generally that Senegal must submit the Habré case for prosecution, “if it 
does not extradite him.”95 Important questions unresolved by the ICJ remain as to whether 
Belgium has the right to request extradition and exercise jurisdiction over Habré under Article 5 
of the CAT; to which state party Senegal must extradite Habré, failing prosecution; and which 
                                                 
92 Id., para. 70.  
93 Id., paras. 12 (Xue, J., diss. op.), 21, 31-32 (Abraham, J., sep. op.), 28 (Sur, J., diss. op.). 
94 Id., para. 68. 
95 Id., paras. 14, 118, 121. 
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state party other than Belgium, if any, would have competence under the CAT to request his 
extradition and prosecution.  
The ICJ does not sufficiently explain the reason why a state party in whose custody the 
accused is present (that is, the Custodial State) has obligations to establish its jurisdiction over 
crimes committed by a foreign national abroad, under Article 5(2), and to initiate criminal 
proceedings in the absence of extradition, under Article 7, of the CAT. In that connection, the 
ICJ’s judgment conflates two separate issues. To say that states parties to the CAT seek to 
protect a “common interest,” for the purpose of monitoring treaty implementation and one party 
bringing a claim before the ICJ “concerning the cessation of an alleged breach by another State 
party,” is one thing.96 However, it is quite another to suggest that parties have “no interests of 
their own” in preventing impunity by requiring a Custodial State to establish jurisdiction and 
undertake a prosecution, failing extradition, under Articles 5(2) and 7. And yet, both are treated 
by the ICJ as one and the same, according to the CAT’s supposed object and purpose: to protect 
a “common interest” by preventing impunity of the perpetrators of torture on behalf of all other 
parties.97 In order to arrive at this conclusion, the ICJ had to overlook the text of Articles 5 and 7. 
As pointed out by Judge ad hoc Sur, the CAT’s object and purpose, as determined by the ICJ, 
“superseded and removed all other considerations.”98  
2. ICJ’s Treatment of Article 5(2) CAT  
Second, the ICJ’s interpretation of the CAT’s object and purpose as the protection of a 
“common interest” influenced its subsequent interpretation and the “nature and meaning” of the 
obligation to extradite or prosecute under Article 7 and the type of jurisdiction arising out of this 
                                                 
96 Id., para. 69. 
97 Id., paras. 68, 74-75. 
98 Id., para. 35 (Sur, J., diss. op.). 
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obligation under Article 5(2) of the CAT. Having determined the admissibility of Belgium’s 
claim, the ICJ, throughout its judgment, described jurisdiction in Article 5(2) of the CAT as 
“universal jurisdiction.”99 In particular, the ICJ noted that the “obligation to establish universal 
jurisdiction” under Article 5(2) is a “necessary condition” for fulfilling the obligations to 
undertake a preliminary inquiry under Article 6(2) and to submit the case to its authorities for 
prosecution under Article 7(1).100 The purpose of these obligations, in the ICJ’s opinion, is to 
“enable proceedings to be brought against the suspect, in the absence of his extradition” and to 
“achieve the object and purpose” of the CAT, which is “to make more effective the struggle 
against torture by avoiding impunity for the perpetrators.”101 In the words of the ICJ, “[t]he 
Convention against Torture thus brings together 150 states which have committed themselves to 
prosecuting suspects in particular on the basis of universal jurisdiction.”102 
Contrary to the ICJ, analysis of the CAT’s text and travaux préparatoires, infra, shows 
extradite or prosecute obligations do not give rise to universal jurisdiction. Paragraph 1 States 
have jurisdiction to prevent impunity because they have important links with an alleged 
offense.103 Therefore, a Custodial State (Senegal in the Habré case) has an obligation under 
Article 5(2) of the CAT to initiate criminal proceedings and assert a type of treaty-based 
jurisdiction failing extradition to one of the Paragraph 1 States referred to in Article 5. Before 
doing so, the next Part examines the impact of the Habré case on other actors in the field of 
international law.  
                                                 
99 Id., para. 74.  
100 Id.  
101 Id., paras. 74, 115.  
102 Id., para. 75. 
103 See also I.C.J., Oral Proceedings, Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Dem. Rep. Congo v. France), 18 (Apr. 
28, 2003). 
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III. APPLICATION OF HABRÉ ONTO UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 
A. ICJ’s Affirmation of Universal Jurisdiction’s Existence 
The ICJ’s description of Article 5(2) as “universal jurisdiction” in is passing, as if such an 
interpretation is beyond question. At first glance, this would appear to provide sanction by the 
World Court to the existence of universal jurisdiction in customary international law and its 
embodiment in the CAT. This is certainly the interpretation offered by the Separate Opinion of 
Judge Cançado Trindade when he asserts that the ICJ’s judgment “captures the rationale of the 
CAT, with the latter’s denationalization of protection, and assertion of the principle of universal 
jurisdiction.”104 Informed by “jusnaturalist thinking”, Judge Cançado Trindade’s reasoning for 
interpreting the extradite or prosecute obligation in the CAT as giving rise to universal 
jurisdiction is, in part, that the principle of universal jurisdiction itself has a “long” history in 
international law and is “set forth in the CAT” in Articles 5(2) and 7(1).105 Therefore, the CAT, 
by establishing universal jurisdiction, “transcends the inter-State dimension, as it purports to 
safeguard not the interests of individual states, but rather the fundamental values shared by the 
international community as a whole.”106 One consequence of this interpretation of the CAT, 
which is not shared by the ICJ, is that all states are required to assert universal jurisdiction over 
alleged perpetrators of torture when found in their territory, “without limits in time (past or 
future) or in space” as to when the conduct occurred and regardless of when the CAT entered 
into force in the prosecuting state.107 If taken to its logical conclusion, however, this would 
suggest that states are permitted by customary international law to assert universal jurisdiction 
                                                 
104 Judgment, supra note 1, para. 123. 
105 Id., para. 177 (Trindade, J., sep. op.). 
106 Id. See also Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.), Provisional Measures, 
2009 I.C.J. REP. 139, paras. 63, 85, 105 (May 28) (Trindade, J., diss. op.).   
107 Id.  
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and initiate prosecutions independently of the CAT and its agreed text, and therefore regardless 
of the suspect being present within the prescribing state’s territory and even if the prescribing 
state is not a party to this instrument at the relevant time when the conduct occurs. In the words 
of Judge Guillaume, this would “risk creating total judicial chaos.”108 
Of the numerous opinions appended to the ICJ’s judgement in the Habré case, only Judge 
Cançado Trindade argues that the principle of universal jurisdiction properly so called is codified 
in the CAT. Nonetheless, it will be recalled that scholars and NGOs interpret the ICJ’s judgment 
as representing a broad call for universal jurisdiction.109 The basis for this interpretation of the 
Habré case in scholarship is explained on two different rationales.  
1. Jus Cogens Create Universal Jurisdiction 
The first basis is the ICJ’s passing reference that “torture is part of customary 
international law and it has become a peremptory norm (jus cogens).”110 According to this view, 
all states have obligations erga omnes to punish individual violators of jus cogens.111 In order to 
perform these obligations, one legal effect of jus cogens is to provide universal jurisdiction over 
international crimes.112 The notion that universal jurisdiction arises from jus cogens and obliges 
all states to prosecute international crimes is itself derived from the judicial dicta of two cases.  
The first of these is the Furundzija case, in which the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) notes that “it would seem that one of the consequences of the jus 
                                                 
108 Arrest Warrant, supra note 2, para. 15 (Guillaume, J., sep. op.). 
109 Part I, notes 59-64. 
110 Judgment, supra note 1, para. 99. Jus cogens constitute peremptory norms of international law “accepted and 
recognized by the international community of States as a whole from which no derogation is permitted,” VCLT, 
May 23, 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, Art. 53. 
111 Obligations erga omnes are owed to the international community as a whole by virtue “of the importance of the 
rights involved, [whereby] all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection …,” Barcelona Traction, 
Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 ICJ REP. 3, paras. 33-34 (Feb. 5). On the meaning of obligations erga 
omnes, see Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 82, Arts. 40-41, 56. 
112 Andenas and Weatherall, supra note 11, at 762-64; Weatherall, supra note 60, at 1154-55; ALEXANDER 
ORAKHELASHVILI, PEREMPTORY NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 288-319, 340-357 (2006). See also 
Judgment, supra note 1, paras. 82-177 (Trindade, J., sep. op.); Tomuschat, supra note 24, at 373. 
24 
 
cogens character” of torture is that every state is entitled to punish individuals accused of torture 
based on universal jurisdiction.113 Second, the Pinochet case, in which Lord Browne-Wilkinson, 
citing Furundzija, comments that “[t]he jus cogens nature of the international crime of torture 
justifies states in taking universal jurisdiction over torture wherever committed.”114 Although 
neither of these cases are examples of assertions of universal jurisdiction or concerned the 
examination of universal jurisdiction,115 the Pinochet case is, nonetheless, depicted in 
scholarship as the most important contemporary example of the exercise of universal jurisdiction 
and the rise of a new international legal order.116 Under this proposed legal order, any state is 
permitted to exercise universal jurisdiction over certain crimes, regardless of the status of alleged 
perpetrators and the immunity to which they may be entitled under international law, for the 
protection of human rights.117  
This interpretation of the relationship between universal jurisdiction and treaty 
obligations to extradite or prosecute, especially in light of the Habré case, is problematical on at 
least two fronts. First, the opinions expressed in Pinochet and Furundzija are lone voices; and 
there is considerable judicial opinion to the contrary that, even when a crime amounts to a jus 
                                                 
113 Furundz̆ija, supra note 54, para. 156.  
114 R v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, exparte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3) [1999] 2 All E.R. 97 (1999), 107 
(Lord Browne-Wilkinson). Lord Millett was also of the opinion that crimes prohibited by international law attract 
universal jurisdiction under customary international law if two criteria are satisfied. First, they must be contrary to a 
peremptory norm of international law so as to infringe a jus cogens. Secondly, they must be so serious and on such a 
scale and international character of the Holocaust that they can justly be regarded as an attack on the international 
legal order, id. at 175-76.  
115 The only authority in support of the propositions advanced in Furundzija and Pinochet are judicial dicta in 
Eichmann (S. Ct.), supra note 28, and Demjanjuk, supra note 28. As explained in Parts IV & V, neither of these 
latter cases are examples of universal jurisdiction either; and in both cases the relationship between universal 
jurisdiction, jus cogens and treaty obligations to extradite or prosecute is not examined. 
116 E.g., Wolfgang Kaleck, From Pinochet to Rumsfield: Universal Jurisdiction in Europe 1998-2008, 30 MICH. 
INT’L L. J. 927, 928, 932, 940, 954 (2009); Langer, supra note 11, at 246-47; Langer, supra note 50, at 1, 4, 18 
(2011); Ved P Nanda, Universal Jurisdiction: It’s Back!, 102 AM. SOC’Y INT’L PROC. 397, 398 (2008); 
Princeton Principles, supra note 25, at 40-41.  
117 For a critical appraisal of the narrative that Pinochet ushered in a new era of criminal accountability for egregious 
violations of human rights, see Ingrid Wuerth, Pinochet’s Legacy Reassessed, 106 AJIL 731 (2012).  
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cogens prohibition, this does not have the legal effect of creating procedural rules, including 
universal jurisdiction.118 Even though the ICJ in the Habré case declared the status of torture as a 
crime under customary international law, the ICJ was not prepared to recognize the existence of 
a customary rule of universal jurisdiction over this or any other crime. Nor does the ICJ refer to 
Pinochet and Furundzija or express that universal jurisdiction has any relationship to 
international crimes or to jus cogens. This would suggest that, in the ICJ’s opinion, international 
crimes do not automatically give rise to universal jurisdiction, irrespective of whether the crime 
in question has attained the status of jus cogens.119  
Second, the ICJ has not recognized which international crimes, other than genocide and 
torture, belong to jus cogens.120 Universal jurisdiction is supposed to be limited to a limited 
category of crimes under international law, but most of the crimes contained in treaties creating 
extradite or prosecute obligations are not heinous or do not have the status of being criminalized 
under international law, such as war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, while many 
states are not parties to them.121 It is not clear how extradite or prosecute regimes give rise to 
universal jurisdiction for international crimes but the exact same regimes do not with respect to 
treaty crimes. Nor is it clear how the categorization of a crime as a jus cogens prohibition has the 
ability to change the agreed jurisdictional provisions contained in treaty obligations to extradite 
                                                 
118 E.g., R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and others, exparte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 1) [1998] 4 
All E.R. 897, 913 (Lord Slynn); Pinochet (No. 3), supra note 114, at 147 (Lord Hope); Jones v. Ministry of Interior 
of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and another (Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs and others intervening); 
Mitchell and others v. Al-Dali and others [2006] UKHL 29; Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. 
Italy: Greece intervening), 2012 I.C.J.  REP. 99, paras. 83, 96 (Feb. 3). See also Dapo Akande & Sangeeta Shah, 
Immunities of State Officials, International Crimes, and Foreign Domestic Courts, 21 EJIL 815, 836 (2011); Yee, 
supra note 7, paras. 4-7. 
119 See also Pinochet (No. 1), id. at 913 (Lord Slynn); Pinochet (No. 3), supra note 114, at 116 (Lord Goff). 
120 See Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & 
Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. REP. 43, paras. 147, 162 (Feb. 26); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. 
Rep. Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 2006 I.C.J. REP. 6, para. 64 (Feb. 3).   
121 Treaties creating extradite or prosecute obligations contain provisions by which the relevant acts are qualified as 
criminal offenses and states undertake to make them punishable under their domestic laws (states have considerable 
discretion on how offenses and the elements of offenses are defined in their domestic laws). 
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or prosecute, especially when such treaties to make no mention of jus cogens. In this regard, 
there is difficulty connecting the majority of extradite or prosecute treaty regimes to the 
protection of international community values, which is at the heart of the universal jurisdiction 
concept.122 Indeed, most treaties providing for extradite or prosecute obligations explicitly 
concern the protection of state interests.123  
2. Universal Jurisdiction Analogy  
The second basis for interpreting the ICJ’s judgment in the Habré case as support for 
universal jurisdiction is the existence of universal jurisdiction in customary international law 
independently of treaties. According to this view, universal jurisdiction has its origins in 
centuries-old custom and an excellent pedigree, while states typically use this type of jurisdiction 
in their national legislation in implementing treaty obligations to extradite or prosecute. And, as 
with universal jurisdiction, the prescriptive jurisdiction arising out of treaty obligations to 
extradite or prosecute and the national laws implementing them is—to quote the words of the 
UN Secretariat—“not conditioned by any jurisdictional considerations of States.”124 Rather, such 
jurisdiction is based solely on the suspect’s “presence” in the prosecuting state’s territory and 
does not establish a “genuine link” to that state.125 Put in slightly different terms, a state is 
obliged to establish its jurisdiction over an offender found in its territory in the absence of any 
other lawful prescriptive jurisdictional link; that is, even if the offense occurs outside its territory 
and neither the offender nor the victims are of its nationality and its national interests are not 
threatened. Therefore, treaties containing extradite or prosecute obligations, by analogy, embody 
                                                 
122 Part I, notes 27-28. 
123 See also Claus Kreß, Universal Jurisdiction over International Crimes and the Instiut de Droit International, 4 J. 
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124 Secretariat survey, supra note 30, para. 44. See also RESTATEMENT (FOURTH), supra note 11, Reporters’ 
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and even mandate the use of universal jurisdiction (regardless of actual treaty text or the status of 
the substantive crime at issue in international law or as jus cogens).126  
This reading of the jurisdiction arising out of the extradite or prosecute obligation in the 
CAT—by placing emphasis on universal jurisdiction in custom and state practice—is equally 
problematic because it is based on the prevailing narrative that universal jurisdiction is well 
established in customary international law and can be analogized with jurisdiction in treaty 
obligations to extradite or prosecute.127 The assumption that universal jurisdiction exists in 
customary international law at present, regardless of its lack of historical foundations, is open to 
question in the light of empirical data on state practice.128 Nonetheless, this reading of the CAT 
has been adopted by leading scholars,129 the UN Committee against Torture;130 some states and 
judicial opinions;131 and the Institute of International Law.132 The same reading in numerous 
treaties other than the CAT has been made by several delegations during work on universal 
                                                 
126 E.g., O’Keefe, supra note 25, at 746-47, 754-55; O’Keefe, supra note 41, at 817, 826; Nanda, supra note 116.  
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jurisdiction at the Sixth Committee;133 AU-EU report;134 ICRC;135 Institute of International 
Law;136 American Law Institute;137 NGOs;138 and in the burgeoning scholarship that has sought 
to clarify the universal jurisdiction concept.139 Perhaps most importantly, in the light of the 
Habré case, this reading has also been endorsed by the ILC during its work on the topic 
“obligation to extradite or prosecute”. 
B. ILC’s Final Report On Treaty Obligations To Extradite Or Prosecute 
After almost a decade of study, in 2014 the ILC at its sixty-sixth session decided to 
expedite the topic and adopt a Final Report on the obligation to extradite or prosecute.140 The 
ICJ’s judgment in the Habré case was delivered before the ILC had opportunity to complete its 
work on this topic. In reliance on the Habré case, the Final Report adopts the ICJ’s reference to 
“universal jurisdiction”141 and cites the Habré case to support the proposition that it may be 
helpful for elucidating the meaning of numerous other conventions that have used the same 
Hague formula.142 Consistent with the trend in the ILC’s practice during the past fifteen years, 
the outcome of the ILC’s work on the extradite or prosecute topic is packaged as a Final Report, 
                                                 
133 E.g., secretary-general report (2010), supra note 18, paras. 21-22; UN secretary-general report, The Scope and 
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rather than a set of draft articles (draft treaty) for the purpose of eventual codification by 
states.143 Nonetheless, it was submitted to the UN General Assembly for dissemination and is 
“intended to assist States” in the implementation of their treaty obligations and advance 
understanding in this key area of international law.144 As with other reports recently produced by 
the ILC, such as the report on the “Fragmentation of International Law”,145 the Final Report, by 
not comprising draft articles, has potential to impact a wider audience of actors in the field of 
international law, “one made up not just of states, but also of attorneys, judges, policymakers, 
and academics.”146 
On closer analysis, however, the reports of the Special Rapporteur and the preparatory 
work of the ILC’s Working Group, on which the Final Report is based, reveals that what the ILC 
really means by the term “universal jurisdiction” is not really universal at all.  
C. Special Rapporteur Rules Out Universal Jurisdiction 
In his preliminary remarks on the obligation to extradite or prosecute topic, the ILC’s 
special rapporteur, having studied the inclusion of such obligations in various treaties since 1970, 
suggested that there had been created a “principle of universality of suppression.”147 The special 
rapporteur proceeded to caution that: 
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[t]he principle of universality of suppression should not be 
identified, however, with the principle of universality of jurisdiction 
…. The universality of suppression in this context means that, as a 
result of application of the obligation to extradite or prosecute 
between States concerned, there is no place where an offender could 
avoid criminal responsibility and could find so-called “safe 
haven.”148 
He therefore made clear that the principle of universal jurisdiction “is not directly 
connected with the obligation to extradite or prosecute.”149 The same opinion was subsequently 
reiterated in the special rapporteur’s reports submitted to the General Assembly.150 However, 
some of the ILC’s members regarded universal jurisdiction as “instrumental to the full operation 
of the obligation to extradite or prosecute”151 and therefore one of the main problems in need of 
resolution is the question of “what kind of relationship – if it is supposed that such a relationship 
exists – between the obligation aut dedere aut judicare and the concept of universal jurisdiction 
should be accepted ….”152 In fact, at no point was the universal jurisdiction concept or its 
relationship with extradite or prosecute obligations, if any, examined by the special rapporteur or 
the ILC. But this relationship was given some initial consideration, perhaps hastily, by the ILC’s 
Working Group in reaction to the ICJ’s judgment in the Habré case. 
D. ILC’s Working Group 
Of the numerous legal questions identified by the Working Group, one of them was the 
relationship between the “The obligation to extradite or prosecute and the principle of universal 
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jurisdiction (does one necessarily imply the other?).”153 The Habré case prompted the Working 
Group to hold a “specially-convened” meeting and evaluate this question in 2012.154 The 
following year, in 2013, the Working Group adopted a report citing with approval the ICJ’s 
reference to “universal jurisdiction.”155 In this report, at no point did the Working Group analyze 
the ICJ’s judgment critically or in depth; rather, the judgment is viewed as “helpful in elucidating 
some aspects relevant to the implementation of the obligation to extradite or prosecute.”156  
Controversially, on the “necessary jurisdiction” in order to implement treaty obligations 
to extradite or prosecute, the report, relying on the Habré case, states that when the crime was 
allegedly committed abroad with no nexus to the forum State, the obligation to extradite or 
prosecute would necessarily reflect an exercise of universal jurisdiction, which is “the 
jurisdiction to establish a territorial jurisdiction over persons for extraterritorial events” where 
neither the victims nor alleged offenders are nationals of the forum State and no harm was 
allegedly caused to the forum State’s own national interests.157 However, the obligation to 
extradite or prosecute can also reflect an exercise of jurisdiction under other bases. Thus, if a 
State can exercise jurisdiction on another basis, universal jurisdiction may not necessarily be 
invoked in the fulfilment of the obligation to extradite or prosecute.158  
The Working Group’s report proceeds to suggest that several treaties, such as the very 
widely ratified 1949 Geneva Conventions and the CAT, “require the exercise of universal 
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jurisdiction over the offenses covered by these instruments.”159 It also cites with approval the 
ICJ’s dictum referring to “universal jurisdiction” and seemingly treats it as reflecting existing lex 
lata.160 And yet, the report does not examine universal jurisdiction or explain what the Working 
Group means by this term.  
1. Working Methods and Sources of Evidence in Support of Universal Jurisdiction  
The above quoted passage raises two important issues. The first concerns the working 
methods and sources of evidence relied upon by the Working Group, while the second pertains to 
the meaning of “universal jurisdiction” and the Working Group offering a different interpretation 
of jurisdiction arising out of extradite or prosecute obligations to that of the ICJ. Turning to the 
first issue, the reference to “universal jurisdiction” is supported by only one tentative, secondary 
source. The scholarly work cited by the Working Group places great emphasis of the accused’s 
‘presence’ in the Custodial State’s territory as the sole basis for interpreting jurisdiction as 
“universal.”161  
The Working Group had before it a working paper prepared by the special rapporteur.162 
In this paper, the special rapporteur states that the 1949 Geneva Conventions and numerous 
subsequent treaties using the Hague formula “envisage an obligation to exercise universal 
jurisdiction.”163 The only source of evidence on which the special rapporteur relies to support the 
above proposition is a “survey of multilateral conventions,” prepared by the UN Secretariat.164 
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However, the survey does not provide any evidence in support of this finding either.165 To its 
credit, the survey does have regard to the preparatory works of the Geneva Conventions, 
although such works are cited wholly out of their proper historical context.166 In particular, the 
survey quotes the “principle of universality” referred to during the Diplomatic Conference for 
the adoption of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. As will be explained, however, this term was a 
reference to the universal application of the extradite or prosecute obligation to all parties, 
including neutrals, and not universal jurisdiction proper.167  
The special rapporteur is also influenced by the adoption of a resolution on universal 
jurisdiction in 2005 by the Institute of International Law. In his opinion, the resolution shows a 
“mutual relationship and – to some extent – an interdependence between universal jurisdiction 
and the obligation aut dedere aut judicare.”168 The resolution not only treats “universal 
jurisdiction” as an existing customary rule over international crimes, in particular genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes.169 It goes one step further and declares that universal 
jurisdiction “can also be established” in treaty obligations to extradite or prosecute.170 A closer 
analysis of the Institute’s preparatory work shows that neither of these propositions was based on 
existing state and treaty practice, not least the Arrest Warrant case and Belgium - the self-
acclaimed pioneer of universal jurisdiction - abolishing the provision for such jurisdiction in its 
national law in 2003 “owing to the abuse of this legislation.”171 Moreover, the Institute adopts as 
a basis for its work advocacy organizations (such as Amnesty International, International Law 
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Association and Princeton Project) and a selective handful of scholars, all of which adopt the 
prevailing narrative and make over-exaggerated claims of the existence of universal jurisdiction 
in custom and confuse it with treaty obligations to extradite or prosecute.172 Yet, in the opinion 
of the Institute’s rapporteur, such works “prove that universal jurisdiction is a principle already 
widely recognized under international instruments.”173  
2. ILC Should Define Universal Jurisdiction 
The second important issue raised by the above quoted passage is the meaning of 
“universal jurisdiction.” The quotation refers to the applicability of “universal jurisdiction” over 
a crime committed abroad having “no nexus to the forum State.”174 As will be explained, infra, 
jurisdiction in treaty obligations to extradite or prosecute has important links to one or more of 
the parties to the relevant treaty regime.175 As jurisdiction is based on treaty, proof that “harm was 
allegedly caused to the forum state’s own national interests,” to quote the Working Group’s 
words, is not required.176 The Custodial State, by failing to extradite, either protects the national 
vital interests of Paragraph 1 States or its own interests. The quotation immediately proceeds to 
explain what the Working Group means by universal jurisdiction, which is nothing more than 
“the jurisdiction to establish a territorial jurisdiction over persons for extraterritorial events.”177 
The latter statement is a quotation of Judges Higgins et al. in the Arrest Warrant case.178 And 
yet, the judges in this case emphasize that jurisdiction in treaty obligations to extradite or 
prosecute is not universal jurisdiction and that such “loose use of language” should be 
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avoided.179 This would suggest that whatever the Working Group may have meant by the term 
“universal jurisdiction” (which is not clear), it does not mean universal jurisdiction proper. In 
any event, the Working Group is not wholly convinced or unanimous that such jurisdiction is 
universal either. Thus, the above quotation states that jurisdiction in the obligation to extradite or 
prosecute would “reflect an exercise of universal jurisdiction,” which is different from the 
finding that it is universal jurisdiction.180 It further suggests that the obligation to extradite or 
prosecute “can also reflect an exercise of jurisdiction under other bases” and that “universal 
jurisdiction may not necessarily be invoked in the fulfilment of the obligation to extradite or 
prosecute.”181 To suggest that jurisdiction in extradite or prosecute obligations is chameleon-like, 
with the ability to reflect territorial jurisdiction at one end of the continuum and universal 
jurisdiction at the other, makes little sense and does not sit neatly with the actual wording of the 
relevant treaty provisions. 
In all likelihood, the Working Group’s cumbersome and convoluted description of 
jurisdiction implementing extradite or prosecute obligations as “territorial,” “universal” and 
“other bases” of jurisdiction was aimed at garnering compromise among delegations at the Sixth 
Committee.182 In this regard, the ILC’s Final Report does not provide authority for interpreting 
the jurisdiction arising out of extradite or prosecute obligations as universal jurisdiction proper.  
In sum, the idea that the prescriptive jurisdiction arising out of treaty obligations to 
extradite or prosecute is not based on any recognized jurisdictional link and therefore can, by 
analogy, be read to impliedly embody and even mandate the use of universal jurisdiction is based 
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on three fundamental premises: namely that the concept of universal jurisdiction is widely used 
in state practice and exists in customary international law at present; the actual text of relevant 
treaty provisions supports such a reading; and the ICJ in the Habré case recognized the existence 
of universal jurisdiction in international law and its embodiment in the CAT. 
IV. THE CASE AGAINST HABRÉ SUPPORTING UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 
This Part argues that the Habré case does not support the existence of universal 
jurisdiction in international law and that jurisdiction in treaty obligations to extradite or 
prosecute is incapable of giving rise to universal jurisdiction. In so doing, it begins by showing 
that the ICJ’s references to “universal jurisdiction” in the Habré case are little more than dicta 
and therefore caution is needed in according them weight. Thereafter, this Part analyzes the text 
of Articles 5 and 7 of the CAT and their travaux préparatoires, both of which are bypassed by 
the ICJ, in order show that treaty obligations to extradite or prosecute do not give rise to 
universal jurisdiction. To suggest otherwise results in the actual text, creating significant 
jurisdictional links with states parties to the CAT, being disregarded. Analysis in this Part 
focuses on the CAT, in the light of the Habré case, but it applies equally to the numerous other 
treaties that create extradite or prosecute obligations, most of which use the same Hague formula 
as the CAT. Lastly, this Part presents the findings of an empirical analysis of state practice in 
order to show that universal jurisdiction does not exist under customary international law at 
present and that common examples of universal jurisdiction state practice are actually different 
types of treaty-based jurisdiction.  
A. ICJ’s Reference to Universal Jurisdiction Reduced to Obiter Dictum  
The ICJ’s characterization of jurisdiction in Article 5(2) of the CAT as “universal 
jurisdiction” in the Habré case does not constitute a meaningful pronouncement of universal 
jurisdiction’s existence in customary international law or its relationship, if any at all, with treaty 
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obligations to extradite or prosecute.183 In this case, the ICJ rejects that it has jurisdiction to 
adjudicate Belgium’s complex and controversial claims relating to customary international law, 
including the existence of a customary rule of universal jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and genocide.184 The ICJ therefore refuses to rule on universal jurisdiction’s 
legality in customary international law and provides no supporting analysis of the existence of 
such a rule over the crime of torture.185 The ICJ finds that it has jurisdiction solely to adjudicate 
obligations under the CAT. However, it leaves unexplained what is meant by “universal 
jurisdiction” or the intended effect of the use of such nomenclature for the development of the 
international law of jurisdiction.186 This is because the ICJ finds that, insofar as Article 5(2) is 
concerned, it has “no jurisdiction in this case.”187 The merits of the case, over which the ICJ has 
jurisdiction, are limited to the determination of what, in the ICJ’s opinion, is the nature and 
meaning of the obligations under Articles 6 and 7 of the CAT, and whether such obligations had 
been violated by Senegal.188 As a result, the ICJ’s references to “universal jurisdiction,” in only a 
limited number of paragraphs and absent, as they are, of any substantive reasoning, is reduced to 
mere obiter dictum.189  
In all likelihood, the ICJ’s references to “universal jurisdiction” impliedly follow the 
earlier decision of the UN Committee against Torture in the Habré case.190 Belgium relied on the 
same decision in the present case as evidence that Article 5(2) codified a customary rule of 
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“universal jurisdiction.”191 However, the Committee did not explain what it meant by “universal 
jurisdiction” either. It follows from the foregoing that one should probably refrain from reading 
too much into the ICJ’s references to “universal jurisdiction” the Habré case. 
As the ICJ had no jurisdiction over Article 5(2),192 this raises the question whether the 
ICJ should have chosen to describe this article as an “obligation to establish universal 
jurisdiction” at all, especially as this term is misleading in the absence of any explanation of its 
meaning and the potential of the court’s jurisprudence to impact other actors in the field of 
international law, not least states, national and regional courts, the ILC, and academics. This 
issue becomes of great importance when one considers that the Hague formula of the extradite or 
prosecute obligation is the same as that used in three-quarters of the criminal law conventions 
adopted since 1970.193 And several states have made excessive claims of the applicability of 
universal jurisdiction over a wide range of treaty crimes, leading to inter-state disputes and little 
progress during the work on the universal jurisdiction topic at the Sixth Committee due to 
incessant disagreement on the basic concept, definition and scope of universal jurisdiction.194 
The sections that follow will therefore aim to show that the ICJ erred in referring to Article 5(2) 
as “universal jurisdiction” (regardless of what was meant by the use of this term). 
B. Article 5(2) CAT: Application of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
The starting point for discussion is that Article 5 of the CAT, as with other treaties 
providing for extradite or prosecute obligations, does not expressly provide for “universal 
jurisdiction.”195 As a general rule of treaty interpretation, the VCLT provides that a treaty shall 
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be interpreted in accordance with “the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”196 The meaning of “context” for the 
purpose of treaty interpretation includes, in addition to the text, the instrument’s preamble.197 
The ICJ in the Habré case describes Article 5(2) as “universal jurisdiction” according to the 
supposed object and purpose of the CAT.198 The phrase “object and purpose” is not defined by 
the VCLT and its meaning is vague and thus open to interpretation.199 Nonetheless, in order to 
interpret the CAT’s object and purpose, one would reasonably expect the ICJ, which is at the 
heart of the international legal system, to have some regard to its “context.” The only extent to 
which the ICJ was prepared to consider context was to refer to a single and somewhat ambiguous 
preambular paragraph, which merely provides that states parties desire “to make more effective 
the struggle against torture.”200 It is solely from this preambular paragraph—and not by 
examining the instrument’s text—that the ICJ infers the CAT’s object and purpose. This would 
suggest that the ICJ does not, in fact, intend to interpret universal jurisdiction proper within the 
“ordinary meaning” of Article 5(2). To have done otherwise would perhaps place more weight 
on this preambular paragraph than it is capable of bearing.  
The following sections provide a textual analysis of Articles 5 and 7 of the CAT and their 
travaux préparatoires, in accordance with the VCLT, in order to show that jurisdiction, even 
though it is capable of being interpreted broadly in Article 5(2), cannot be considered to include 
universal jurisdiction within its “ordinary meaning.” It further shows that the ICJ, by overlooking 
the text of Article 5, not only misinterprets the CAT’s “object and purpose,” but also the 
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meaning of jurisdiction in Article 5(2) and the obligation to extradite or prosecute in Article 7, as 
the exclusive protection of a “common interest.” 
C. Article 5 CAT: Textual Analysis 
As with all treaties that use the Hague formula, the CAT, by virtue of Article 5(2), 
provides that “[e]ach State Party shall . . . take such measures as may be necessary to establish its 
jurisdiction over such offenses [referred to in Article 4] in cases where the alleged offender is 
present in any territory under its jurisdiction and it does not extradite him pursuant to article 8 to 
any of the States mentioned in paragraph I of this article.”201 As can be seen, the wording in 
Article 5(2) defines the scope of a party’s obligation to “establish its jurisdiction” over relevant 
offenses. This is limited by express terms to “cases where the alleged offender is present in any 
territory under its jurisdiction” and the failure, for whatever reason, to “extradite him . . . to any 
of the States mentioned” in Article 5(1). The “presence” of the accused in a state party’s territory 
is relevant for triggering the obligation to enforce jurisdiction and implement the extradite or 
prosecute obligation under Article 7 of the CAT. Therefore, a Custodial State must provide for 
prescriptive jurisdiction that is sufficiently broad to cover crimes committed by foreign nationals 
abroad that have a link with Paragraph 1 States and where the accused is not extradited to them, 
as envisaged by the text of Article 5(2) referred to above.   
Notably, the ICJ in the Habré case focuses exclusively on the “presence” of the accused 
and gives no consideration to the meaning of the words “does not extradite him . . . to any of the 
States mentioned in paragraph I of this article.”202 Evidently, the meaning of Article 5(2) should 
not be read in isolation from the “States mentioned” in Article 5(1). Yet the ICJ provides no 
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41 
 
analysis of that paragraph. The only extent to which the ICJ has regard to Article 5(1) is in 
passing, towards the end of its judgment. The ICJ observes that the Custodial State “does indeed 
have the option of extraditing [the accused]” to a Paragraph 1 State, “but on the condition that it 
is to a State which has jurisdiction in some capacity, pursuant to Article 5 of the Convention, to 
prosecute and try him.”203 The above quoted passage raises two important issues. First, the 
“option” of extradition does not reflect the actual text of Article 5(2). It makes clear that 
extradition to a Paragraph 1 State is an obligation, and only if the Custodial State “does not 
extradite him” does it then have an obligation to undertake a prosecution. It follows that, unless a 
Paragraph 1 State has made out a prima facie case that it has jurisdiction by virtue of a link with 
the case in question, then a Custodial State is permitted, but certainly has no obligation, to 
extradite or prosecute. As will be explained in the discussion of Article 7 of the CAT, infra, this 
oversight led the ICJ to misinterpret the nature and meaning of the obligation to extradite or 
prosecute in finding that prosecution is an international obligation, while extradition is merely an 
“option.” Second, the condition that a Paragraph 1 State must have “jurisdiction in some 
capacity” before an alleged offender can be extradited would make little sense had the ICJ 
interpreted the CAT as providing for a principle of universal jurisdiction. In fact, Article 5(1) 
would be redundant. 
D. Article 5(1) CAT: “Special Link” with Paragraph 1 States 
Although the ICJ sidestepped discussion of Article 5(1), the importance of it justifies its 
quotation in full: 
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[e]ach State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to 
establish its jurisdiction over the offenses referred to in article 4 in 
the following cases: (a) [w]hen the offenses are committed in any 
territory under its jurisdiction or on board a ship or aircraft registered 
in that State; (b) [w]hen the alleged offender is a national of that 
State; (c) [w]hen the victim is a national of that State if that State 
considers it appropriate.204 
 Article 5(1) thus sets out the circumstances in which states parties are required, and 
permitted in the case of subsection (c), to establish jurisdiction and request extradition over 
relevant offenses, by virtue of the territoriality, active nationality and—so-called by Belgium in 
the Habré case—“passive personality” principles of jurisdiction in customary international 
law.205 The text of Article 5(1) would suggest that the CAT’s object and purpose is to prevent 
impunity when an offense has important jurisdictional links, or—in the words of the UN 
Secretariat, “a special link”—with one or more states parties, namely where an offense has been 
committed on a party’s territory or by its nationals or against its nationals. Torture can, by 
definition, only be “inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a 
public official or other person acting in an official capacity.”206 During the drafting of the CAT, 
some states were concerned with the protection of their own nationals from acts of torture 
committed by state officials abroad. The commission of such acts is injurious to the state itself, 
constituting an internationally wrongful act within the meaning of the rules of state responsibility 
and giving rise to a legal right of diplomatic protection.207 On the other hand, the requirement to 
establish jurisdiction over offenses committed against a state’s nationals abroad raised concerns 
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for a number of delegations during the travaux préparatoires of Article 5, as such jurisdiction 
could be abused and would be impractical. It was therefore made optional.208 Based on the 
foregoing, it is therefore reasonable to suppose that torture committed against one of its own 
nationals implicates certain of that state’s national vital interests, including its sovereignty, 
political independence and governmental functions, and that impunity is prevented to protect 
such interests in addition to the human rights of their own nationals.  
E. Article 5(2) CAT: Prescriptive Link with Paragraph 1 States 
Article 5(2) is undoubtedly broad and requires no prescriptive link to be evidenced 
between a Custodial State’s jurisdiction and an offense committed abroad. However, the text in 
Article 5(2), when read as a whole and in conjunction with Article 5(1), leads to the conclusion 
that the scope of a Custodial State’s jurisdiction is limited to crimes within the treaty regime of 
the CAT that have a meaningful link with one of the Paragraph 1 States.209 The wording of 
Article 5(2) presupposes that Paragraph 1 States would be able to exercise their jurisdiction over 
a relevant offense had the accused been extradited.210 As will be explained, infra, the purpose of 
Article 5(2) is thus to place an obligation on a Custodial State to establish its jurisdiction on 
behalf of Paragraph 1 States in cases of non-extradition.211 The jurisdiction in Article 5(2), when 
viewed in its proper context, cannot be interpreted as impliedly embodying a principle of 
                                                 
208 Human Rights Commission, Summary prepared by the UN secretary-general, paras. 15, 17, 22, 70, 73, UN Doc. 
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universal jurisdiction within its “ordinary meaning.”212 To suggest otherwise does not sit neatly 
with a textual analysis of Article 5(2) as a whole, or when read in conjunction with Article 5(1). 
It may even be said to misconstrue the textual situation, as parts of the text in Article 5(2), as 
well as the text in Article 5(1), are made redundant.213 It also places undue emphasis on the mere 
“presence” of the accused in a Custodial State’s territory, which is a precondition for the 
obligation to the exercise of jurisdiction in any given case.   
The ICJ in the Habré case, by focusing on the mere “presence” of the accused in the 
wording of Article 5(2), leads the ICJ to remark, somewhat misleadingly, that a Custodial State 
has an obligation to prosecute acts of torture and prevent impunity on behalf of all other parties 
for the exclusive protection of a “common interest.”214 This does not sit neatly with the textual 
analysis of Article 5, which shows that parties to the CAT—to quote the words of the ICJ—do 
have “interests of their own” in the prevention of impunity.215 The reason why the ICJ 
considered only half of the text of Article 5(2) and did not examine jurisdiction in this article or 
its relationship with the jurisdictional provisions in Article 5(1) may be explained by the ICJ’s 
determination of the admissibility of Belgium’s claim (as a basis for bringing proceedings before 
the ICJ) based solely on its status as a party to the CAT.216 The opinions appended to the ICJ’s 
judgment cast doubt on Belgium’s principal claim that it had the right to exercise jurisdiction 
under the Article 5(1)(c) of the CAT and its entitlement to request the extradition of Habré under 
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Article 7 of the CAT, as the victims were not Belgian nationals at the time the alleged offences 
occurred in Chad.217 
Even if jurisdictional links to Paragraph 1 States were not explicit in Article 5(1) of the 
CAT, jurisdiction arising out of the extradite or prosecute obligation in Article 5(2) is still not 
universal jurisdiction properly so called, as treaty obligation to exercise jurisdiction and the 
presence of the suspect are required.218 Only when a treaty gives the parties thereto jurisdiction 
over crimes having no link with any of the parties to the treaty would universal jurisdiction be 
established.219 During the preparatory work of the Institute of International Law for a resolution 
on universal jurisdiction, the same point was acknowledged by several of the Institute’s eminent 
members and in the text of a draft resolution.220 However, this was omitted from the resolution 
ultimately adopted in 2005.221 That Article 5(2) does not establish a principle of universal 
jurisdiction is further corroborated by the travaux préparatoires.  
F. Article 5(2) CAT: Travaux Préparatoires 
The VCLT provides for a supplementary means of interpretation, by having recourse to 
the preparatory work of the treaty, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the textual 
analysis.222 The only extent to which the ICJ is prepared to observe the travaux préparatoires of 
the CAT in the Habré case is to note, in passing, that Article 7(1) of the instrument is modelled 
on the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft Convention.223 This statement explains 
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nothing as to the nature and meaning of the extradite or prosecute obligation under Article 7(1) 
or whether Article 5(2) embodies a customary rule of jurisdiction, no less a principle of universal 
jurisdiction. As the ICJ does not undertake a textual analysis of Article 5 or examine the CAT’s 
travaux préparatoires, the result is that the ICJ’s reference to “universal jurisdiction” is, to quote 
the wording of Article 31 of the VCLT, left “ambiguous or obscure.”224   
The CAT’s travaux préparatoires show that jurisdiction in Article 5(2) should not be 
interpreted as embodying a customary rule of universal jurisdiction.225 One of the most 
controversial issues debated during the CAT’s drafting is the question of so-called “universal 
jurisdiction.”226 A close reading of the debates within the Working Group, which was established 
by the Human Rights Commission for the purpose of drawing up a draft convention, reveals that 
the extradite or prosecute obligation had first been used in a draft convention proposed by 
Sweden.227 The Swedish Government, in submitting the draft to the Human Rights Commission, 
uses the term “principle of universality” as nothing more than a loose but convenient way to 
describe jurisdiction in the obligation to extradite or prosecute. The obligation is understood by 
the Swedish Government to correspond with provisions in a number of existing conventions 
against various acts of international terrorism.228 As pointed out by Professors Burgers and 
Danelius, the respective representatives of the Netherlands and Sweden to the Human Rights 
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Commission and, respectively, the Working Group Chairman and the draftsmen of the first draft 
of the convention, Article 5(2) is, “with some simplification, called ‘universal jurisdiction.’”229 
Nevertheless, the Working Group uses the Swedish draft as the basis of its work. The comments 
made by delegations participating in the Working Group, as well as the comments submitted by 
governments on the draft to the UN Secretary-General, illustrate that the nomenclature 
“universal jurisdiction” continues to be used in order to describe the extradite or prosecute 
obligation throughout the drafting of the CAT.230 Thus, it should be of little surprise that, in 
1984, the Working Group Chairman reports that “[t]he inclusion of universal jurisdiction in the 
draft convention was no longer opposed by any delegation.”231   
To accept at face value the Working Group’s reference to “universal jurisdiction,” other 
than as a non-technical term used to describe the extradite or prosecute obligation, as have some 
(including Belgium in the Habré case),232 risks attributing to Article 5(2) legal consequences that 
were not debated or intended.233 It would have made little sense for delegations during the 
CAT’s drafting to negotiate and set out in Article 5(1) three narrow grounds of jurisdiction, only 
for Article 5(2)—a subsidiary paragraph—to establish an all-encompassing, obligatory principle 
of universal jurisdiction.234 Had the drafters been convinced of the applicability of a principle of 
universal jurisdiction, then surely they would not have stressed such alternative grounds of 
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jurisdiction. This conclusion is supported for three further reasons. First, the existence and 
legality of universal jurisdiction in customary international law, as well as the implications raised 
by expanding such a rule to include crimes proscribed in treaties, was not examined by the 
Working Group. This is corroborated by an explanatory memorandum on the ratification of the 
CAT presented during the 1986-1987 Session of the Dutch Parliament. In this memorandum, the 
Ministers of Justice and of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands declared that the “very severe 
offenses” proscribed in the CAT “could not in themselves justify the application of the principle 
of universal jurisdiction to such offenses. Repression of these violations should be left to the 
States that had a tie with the person or the place where the crime was committed.”235 This 
declaration is all the more significant in that the Netherlands’ representative had been Chairman 
of the Working Group and one of the instrument’s draftsmen. Second, it is unlikely that the 
Working Group intended to codify a principle of jurisdiction whose meaning and definition, then 
as now, are controversial and little understood. Lastly, a number of states that participated in the 
drafting of Article 5(2) have subsequently confirmed that it was not intended to codify a 
principle of universal jurisdiction.236  
On closer analysis, the reason why jurisdiction in the extradite or prosecute obligation is 
described as “universal jurisdiction” during the CAT’s drafting is because of an over-simplistic 
analogy between the absence of an express jurisdictional link in Article 5(2) and the belief of the 
existence of a historical customary rule of universal jurisdiction over piracy. The US delegation 
goes so far as to expressly state that torture is “like” piracy in order to justify the description “of 
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an obligation to prosecute or extradite” as “universal jurisdiction.”237 It is worth noting that, prior 
to the drafting of the CAT, extradite or prosecute obligations had come to be loosely referred to 
as “universal jurisdiction” during the negotiation of other treaties based on the same piracy 
analogy.238 This issue becomes of great importance when one considers that the same analogy 
has been repeated, once again, during the work on universal jurisdiction at the Sixth 
Committee.239  
G. Textual Analysis of Article 7(1) CAT Supports Prosecution on Behalf of Paragraph 1 States 
1. Prosecution Arises Failing Extradition to Paragraph 1 States 
The interpretation of Article 5(2) of the CAT as placing an obligation on a Custodial 
State to establish its jurisdiction on behalf of Paragraph 1 States in cases of non-extradition, 
rather than establishing universal jurisdiction, is further supported by analysis of the text and 
travaux préparatoires of Article 7 of the CAT. Article 7 provides for the extradite or prosecute 
obligation. The travaux préparatoires make clear that Articles 5(2) and 7 have to be read 
together because of their complementary nature.240 Article 7(1) reaffirms the Custodial State’s 
duty to submit a case for prosecution “if it does not extradite him” to any of the states 
“contemplated in article 5.” This wording in Article 7(1) is not examined by the ICJ in the Habré 
case. The same point applies mutatis mutandis to Article 6(4), which provides that the Custodial 
State “shall immediately notify the States referred to in article 5, paragraph 1, of the fact that 
such person is in custody and of the circumstances which warrant his detention.” It immediately 
proceeds to note that “[t]he State which makes the preliminary inquiry contemplated in 
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paragraph 2 of this article shall promptly report its findings to the said States and shall indicate 
whether it intends to exercise jurisdiction.” This would suggest that Paragraph 1 States have the 
right, upon being notified, to request extradition of the alleged offender, after the Custodial State 
has undertaken a “preliminary inquiry” but has not yet “exercised jurisdiction.”241 The failure by 
the Custodial State to extradite the accused to a Paragraph 1 State, for whatever reason, then has 
a duty to exercise its jurisdiction and prosecute on their behalf.242 In a similar vein, Article 7(2) 
seeks to further safeguard the interests of Paragraph 1 States in the event of non-extradition. It 
provides that, in cases where states parties are operating on the basis of Article 5(2), the evidence 
required for prosecution “shall in no way be less stringent than those which apply in the cases 
referred to in article 5, paragraph 1.” As indicated by the travaux préparatoires, Article 7(2) was 
included due to the official status of the alleged offenders and the risk of “trials on the basis of 
spurious accusations inspired by political motives.”243  
2. Absence of a Prior Extradition Request by Paragraph 1 States Does Not Imply 
Universal Jurisdiction 
One of the issues raised during the drafting of Article 5(2) was the circumstances in 
which a Custodial State would have an obligation under Article 7 to prosecute on behalf of a 
Paragraph 1 State. One delegation proposed to add the words “after receiving a request for 
extradition,” after the words “and it does not extradite him,” the purpose of which was to limit 
the Custodial State’s obligation to establish its jurisdiction after receiving an extradition request 
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by a Paragraph 1 State.244 Other delegations opposed the proposed amendment, as it could 
facilitate the creation of loopholes.245  
Treaties which do not make the obligation to prosecute conditional upon refusal of a prior 
request for extradition, such as the CAT, implies that states are required to exercise universal 
jurisdiction over the offenses covered by these conventions.246 This view also seems to be shared 
by the ICJ in the Habre case when it suggests, obiter dictum, that the “obligation to establish 
universal jurisdiction” under Article 5(2) is a “necessary condition” for fulfilling the obligation 
to submit the case to its authorities for prosecution under Article 7(1).247 As will be explained, 
infra, the establishment of jurisdiction in Article 5(2) is necessary for fulfilling the obligation to 
initiate criminal proceedings under Article 7, failing extradition to a Paragraph 1 State, but this 
does not automatically imply that it is “universal jurisdiction”. However, the ICJ goes one step 
further and interprets the “nature and meaning” of the extradite or prosecute obligation under 
Article 7(1) in the following way. 
In the ICJ’s opinion the choice between extradition or submission for prosecution, 
pursuant to the Convention, does not mean that the two alternatives are to be given the same 
weight. Extradition is an option offered to the State by the Convention, whereas prosecution is an 
international obligation under the Convention, the violation of which is a wrongful act engaging 
the responsibility of the State.248  
In coming to the above finding, the ICJ reasons that only if the Custodial State has 
“received a request for extradition in any of the cases envisaged in the provisions of the 
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Convention [under Article 5(1)], it can relieve itself of its obligation to prosecute by acceding to 
that request.”249 In reaching this finding, the ICJ seems to impliedly follow the earlier decision of 
the Committee Against Torture in the Habré case.250  
With respect, the ICJ is incorrect in its approach to interpreting the “nature and meaning” 
of the extradite or prosecute obligation, which gives the impression that the Custodial State has a 
positive and absolute obligation under the CAT to prosecute any act of torture, which exists ipso 
facto and arises as soon as the suspect is present in its territory, regardless of any request for 
extradition by a Paragraph 1 State. Conversely, only when such a request is made (if a request is 
made at all) does the Custodial State have discretion to choose the option of an alternative 
course, namely extradition of the alleged offender to a Paragraph 1 State. According to the ICJ, 
interpreting the obligation to prosecute in Article 7(1) in this way is “intended to allow the 
fulfilment of the Convention’s object and purpose.”251 The ICJ thus interprets the nature and 
meaning of Article 7(1) in the same way as jurisdiction in Article 5(2) of the CAT, namely the 
protection of a “common interest” and not the interests of particular states parties.252 It will be 
recalled that the ICJ interprets the CAT’s object and purpose this way in order to preserve the 
admissibility of Belgium’s claim and according to a single preambular paragraph.  
The absolute “obligation” to prosecute and “option” of extradition do not reflect the 
actual text of Articles 5(2) and 7(1). The travaux préparatoires indicate that the absence of an 
extradition request was a compromise intended to place the burden on the Custodial State to 
                                                 
249 Id. 
250 Suleymane Guengueng, supra note 130, para. 9.7. In this case, Senegal argued that there would be an obligation 
to prosecute under Article 7 of the CAT only after an extradition request had been made and refused, which the 
Committee rejected. The UN Secratriat also suggests that, on the basis of this decision, it may be argued that treatise 
utilizing the Hague formula give rise to an obligation to prosecute ipso facto independently from any request for 
extradition, secretariat survey, supra note 30, paras.127-31. 
251 Judgment, supra note 1, para. 115. 
252 Part II, notes 87-98.  
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offer extradition, rather than on a Paragraph 1 State to request extradition, thus making more 
effective the ability of the latter to obtain the whereabouts and custody of an accused seeking 
refuge overseas. It is for this reason that Article 5(2) makes the Custodial State’s duty “to 
establish its jurisdiction” conditional upon the failure to extradite to a Paragraph 1 State. Only 
after a Custodial State has “immediately notified” a Paragraph 1 State of an alleged offender’s 
presence in its territory, in accordance with Article 6, and the Custodial State subsequently fails, 
for whatever reason, to extradite the suspect to a Paragraph 1 State, does an obligation arise to 
submit the case for prosecution under Article 7(1). It follows that unless one of the parties 
“contemplated in Article 5” and having a jurisdictional link with an offense makes an extradition 
request (upon being notified by a Custodial State of his presence and the charges against him), 
then there is no international obligation for a Custodial State to actually exercise its jurisdiction 
under Article 5(2) and prosecute an alleged offender under Article 7(1). The ICJ glosses over the 
actual wording of these provisions. 
Only by viewing parts of the text of Article 5(2) selectively and in isolation, as well as 
overlooking the relationship between that text and Articles 5(1), 6(4) and 7, can the ICJ’s 
interpretation of the obligation to extradite or prosecute be maintained. A textual analysis of 
Articles 5 and 7 of the CAT leads to the following propositions. First, extradition and 
prosecution are both international obligations under the CAT and, contrary to the ICJ, the 
obligation to prosecute only arises when the obligation to extradite to a Paragraph 1 State is not 
fulfilled. Second, the nature and meaning of the obligation to extradite or prosecute is not 
exclusively to protect a “common interest.” Rather, it is to enable Paragraph 1 States to obtain 
the custody of the accused, or have such persons prosecuted on their behalf, failing extradition.  
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In sum, the analysis of the text and travaux préparatoires of Articles 5 and 7 of the CAT 
points to the conclusion that the principle of universal jurisdiction does not fall within the CAT’s 
scope. Of course, treaties are living instruments and they may, through subsequent state practice, 
change to include universal jurisdiction.253 However, for reasons spelled out in the following 
section, there is insufficiently general and widespread practice to suggest a different outcome. 
The conditions attached to jurisdiction in Article 5(2) of the CAT and numerous other treaties 
that use extradite or prosecute obligations would suggest that it should be called something else 
other than “universal jurisdiction.”254 The ordinary meaning of jurisdiction in Article 5(2), based 
on the above textual analysis, is capable of an alternative interpretation, namely a form of 
“treaty-based jurisdiction.”255 
H. Universal Jurisdiction’s Existence in Customary International Law at Present: False 
Analogies 
There is a further reason why jurisdiction in treaty obligations to extradite or prosecute 
should not be interpreted to imply or mandate universal jurisdiction: as a prerequisite, this 
interpretation is dependent upon the presumed existence of a customary rule of universal 
jurisdiction and its applicability over a broad range of crimes for the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction in implementing treaty obligations to extradite or prosecute. And yet, the assumption 
that universal jurisdiction has a long and honorable past is based on the prevailing narrative, 
which developed prior to the Habré case, and amounts to a misreading of history.256 On closer 
analysis, universal jurisdiction is based on false foundations in customary international law and 
has developed—out of scholarship rather than state practice—as a hollow concept.257  
                                                 
253 Supra note 110. 
254 Reydams, supra note 8, at 7, 16.  
255 Part V, notes 285-309.  
256 Part I, notes 46-57. 
257 Id.  
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1. Domestic Prosecutions for International Crimes 
An empirical analysis of actual state practice (legislation of 78 states and actual trials 
purported to involve universal jurisdiction in domestic courts with respect to international 
crimes) reveals that universal jurisdiction remains a hollow concept without state practice to the 
present day.258 The survey was conducted in the period between the Eichmann trial in 1961 - a 
trial widely cited by scholars as the most important historical example of universal jurisdiction - 
to 2016.259 The findings of this survey are presented in table 1.  
 
TABLE 1. International Crimes Prosecutions 
Prosecuting state Number of trials Nationality and number of 
suspects 
Austria 1 Former Yugoslav (1) 
Belgium 4 Rwandan (8) 
Canada 2 Former Nazi (1) 
Rwandan (1) 
Denmark 1 Former Yugoslav (1) 
France 5 Former Nazi (1) 
Mauritanian (1) 
Tunisian (1) 
Rwandan (3) 
Germany 6 Former Nazi (1) 
Former Yugoslav (4) 
Rwandan (2) 
Israel 1 Former Nazi (1) 
The Netherlands 6 Afghans (3) 
Congolese (1) 
                                                 
258 These states are as follows: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, 
Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, DRC, Egypt, El 
Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Liechtenstein, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, 
Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Russia, Slovakia, Senegal, 
Seychelles, Singapore, Spain, Slovenia, Swaziland, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, The Netherlands, Tunisia, Turkey, UAE, Ukraine, Uganda, UK, US, Vietnam, 
Zambia. 
259 The survey was undertaken by the present author by examining a range of sources, including: UN General 
Assembly and its Sixth Committee documents during the work on universal jurisdiction; LEXIS-NEXIS and 
Westlaw; specialized journals, Web sites, such as legislationonlie, the Hague Justice Portal; NGO reports, such as 
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Redress and Trial Watch; newspaper articles and other media 
documents; and the Google search engine. The survey was compiled as of May 2016.  
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Rwandan (2) 
Surinamese (1) 
Norway 1 Former Yugoslav (1) 
Spain 1 Argentinian (1) 
Switzerland 2 Former Yugoslav (1) 
Rwandan (1) 
Senegal 1 Chadian (1) 
U.K. 3 Former Nazi (1) 
Afghan (1) 
Nepalese (1) 
Total   
13 states 34  
 
The results of this empirical research, as table 1 shows, is a total of 34 trials in 13 
states.260 On the basis of table 1, it is possible to identify a typology of three situations in which 
states undertake prosecutions on the basis of extraterritorial jurisdiction: (i) World War II (5 
trials); (ii) treaty obligations to extradite or prosecute (10 trials); and (iii) internal armed conflicts 
in the territories of the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (19 trials). All of these situations actually 
involve the implementation of different types of treaty-based jurisdiction, in which there are 
sufficiently close connections to the prosecuting state or to one of its treaty partners, and are not 
examples of universal jurisdiction.261 In a similar vein, national laws, enacted to give effect to 
these treaty regimes, provide for treaty-based rather than universal jurisdiction.262 The work on 
universal jurisdiction at the Sixth Committee reveals that most states accept the existence of a 
customary rule of universal jurisdiction in their opinio juris and verbal practice. However, with 
the exception of piracy on the high seas, much of this is far from uniform and, on closer analysis, 
is really support for treaty-based types of jurisdiction.263 Evidence of actual state practice in 
                                                 
260 The term “former Nazi” is used to denote the fact that suspects were prosecuted for alleged crimes committed in 
the context of World War II on behalf of the Nazi regime. 
261 See Part V, notes 336-409, for case studies illustrating these different types of treaty-based jurisdiction.  
262 This includes national laws implementing the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Jul. 17, 1998, 
2187 UNTS 3) (“ICC Statute”), which establishes a mandatory treaty regime of extradition if there is a failure to 
prosecute an alleged offender present in a state party’s territory, pursuant to the principle of complementarity. 
263 Part V, notes 338-411. 
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support of universal jurisdiction proper in customary international law is nonexistent.264 This 
would suggest that the status of universal jurisdiction in customary international law, at present, 
is uncertain and controversial. Therefore, the idea that extradite or prosecute obligations can be 
read as impliedly embodying or mandating the use of universal jurisdiction because it is well 
established in customary international law, regardless of the actual treaty text, is premised on 
false analogies.265 
2. Existing Studies Confuse Treaty-Based Jurisdiction as “Universal Jurisdiction” 
The trials in table 1 are often claimed by scholars and NGOs (and some governments and 
courts) to be based on universal jurisdiction.266 For example, to date the most comprehensive 
survey of state practice with respect to assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction for the 
prosecution of international crimes has been undertaken by Professor Langer.267 Although 
Professor Langer does not identify any practice additional to that in table 1; all of these trials are 
categorized as examples of universal jurisdiction.268 Professor Langer does not examine 
examples of state practice in any detail, or their significance for establishing customary 
international law over particular crimes. Moreover, Professor Langer acknowledges the 
weakness of the argument that treaty obligations to extradite or prosecute provide a basis for 
                                                 
264 Notably, during proceedings in the Habré case, in response to a question put by Judge Greenwood, Belgium 
endeavored to show that a customary rule of universal jurisdiction exists over war crimes, crimes against humanity 
and genocide. This is of great importance because states rarely attempt to explain themselves by evidencing the 
existence of customary rules. To quote the words of Judge Abraham, Belgium “fell far short of doing so.” See Reply 
of Belgium to Judge Greenwood, Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Mar. 28, 2012); 
Judgement, supra note 1, para. 33 (Abraham, J., sep. op). 
265 Reydams, supra note 8, at 7-8. 
266 E.g., Dicker, supra note 129, at 235; Kaleck, supra note 116, at 958; Wolfgang Kaleck, Remarks, 102 AM. 
SOC’Y INT’L PROC. 397, 402 (2008); Eugene Kontorovich and Steven Art, An Empirical Examination of 
Universal Jurisdiction for Piracy, 104 AJIL 436 (2010); Langer, supra note 50, at 7-9; Nanda, supra note 116, at 
398-400; Beth Van Schaack & Zarco Perovic, The Prevalence of ‘‘Present-In’’ Jurisdiction, 107 AM. SOC’Y INT’L 
PROC. 233, 241 (2013); Peter Weiss, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE, 107 AM. 
SOC’Y INT’L PROC. 233, 407-08 (2013). 
267 See also Van Schaack & Perovic, id. at 237.  
268 Langer, supra note 50.  
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universal jurisdiction and that the Rome Statute of the ICC does not authorize universal 
jurisdiction either.269 Nevertheless, Professor Langer clearly adopts universal jurisdiction’s 
prevailing narrative270 and therefore all national laws and trials pursuant to such treaties are 
counted as examples of universal jurisdiction, even though the states concerned may not share 
the same view.271 This leads Professor Langer to suggest that many states have passed universal 
jurisdiction statutes and that such jurisdiction has been used to prosecute international crimes, 
including genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and torture, for the past several 
decades.272 A similar claim has been made in a major survey of state practice by Amnesty 
International,273 prepared for the purpose of informing Sixth Committee discussions on universal 
jurisdiction, on which Langer partly relies.274 The Amnesty survey counts states as having 
automatically provided for universal jurisdiction legislation if the state has implemented treaty 
obligations to extradite or prosecute (which according to Amnesty provide for an “express” 
obligation to exercise universal jurisdiction), but also treaties that do not provide for such 
obligations, such as the Genocide Convention and the Rome Statute of the ICC (which provide 
for an “implied” obligation to exercise universal jurisdiction).275 This leads Amnesty to conclude 
that 147 out of 193 states “have provided for universal jurisdiction” over one of more 
international crimes, while a total of 91 states have provided for such jurisdiction “over ordinary 
crimes, even when the conduct does not involve conduct amounting to a crime under 
                                                 
269 Id. at 4 & note 281.  
270 Part I, notes 50-57.  
271 Id. at 4, 15, 25 (e.g., Note submitted to the Office of Legal Affairs (UK), supra note 236). 
272 See also Langer, supra note 11.  
273 Supra note 17. 
274 Langer, supra note 50, nn.2, 21. 
275 Supra note 8, at 9.  
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international law.”276 Moreover, since World War II, prosecutions based on universal jurisdiction 
have been instituted in 6 states additional to those in table 1.277  
3. State Practice Does Not Evidence Universal Jurisdiction in Custom or Prove Treaty Support 
for Universal Jurisdiction     
Problematically, such studies risk creating an inaccurate empirical picture because the 
degree of state practice in support of universal jurisdiction (and its importance as a tool for 
preventing impunity) are overstated.278 It also leads to such claims that universal jurisdiction is 
exercised almost exclusively by European and Western nations in respect of international 
crimes;279 universal jurisdiction is “alive and well” in customary international law280 and “widely 
exercised in many countries”;281 and that over 100 states provide for universal jurisdiction in 
their legislation, including in the implementation of treaty obligations to extradite or prosecute, 
which proves that such treaties support universal jurisdiction’s existence.282 However, this is 
incorrect because in each of the cases identified in table 1, a “clear and objective link existed 
with the forum state” and none of them provide proper examples of universal jurisdiction.283 
That is to say, despite the opinio juris and verbal practice of all 13 states in table 1 being in favor 
of universal jurisdiction, the prosecution of international crimes on the basis of universal 
jurisdiction stricto sensu has turned out to be non-existent. Put differently, the actual practice of 
                                                 
276 Id. at 12. It further finds that an additional 16 states “can exercise universal jurisdiction over conduct amounting 
to a crime under international law, but only as an ordinary crime [as defined in the state’s domestic law],” id.   
277 Id. at 10.  
278 Reydams, supra note 8, at 13-16; Ryan Goodman, Counting Universal Jurisdiction State’s: What’s Wrong with 
Amnesty International’s Numbers (Dec. 13, 2013), at https://www.justsecurity.org/4581/amnesty-international-
universal-jurisdiction-preliminary-survey-legislation-world/; Van Schaack & Perovic, supra note 266, at 238-39. 
279 Kontorovich & Art, supra note 266, at 437, 453. See also Nanda, supra note 116, Van Schaack & Perovic, id. at 
241. 
280 Nanda, id. at 401. 
281 Kaleck, supra note 266, at 402. 
282 Nanda, supra note 116, at 398; Christopher K. Hall, Remarks, 102 AM. SOC’Y INT’L PROC. 397, 401 (2008). 
See also Dicker, supra note 129, at 233; RESTATEMENT (FOURTH), supra note 11, Reporters’ Note 2. 
283 Reydams, supra note 8, at 14-16. See also Yee supra note 7, paras. 30-31, 42; UN Doc. A/C.6/70/SR.12, supra 
note 17, para. 109 (China). See also Van Schaack & Perovic, supra note 266, at 240. 
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these states shows that at no time has a state been willing to act as an “agent of the international 
community” and prosecute any crime committed anywhere in the world, whoever their authors 
and victims, for the exclusive protection of international community values. On the contrary, the 
data reveals that states (including those states invoking “universal jurisdiction”) only undertake 
prosecutions when jurisdiction has a treaty basis and they have a sufficiently close link with the 
crime in question. It is the meaning of treaty-based jurisdiction to which this article will now 
turn.  
V. TREATY JURISDICTION IS THE ACTUAL BASIS OF JURISDICTION 
This final Part argues that only treaty-based jurisdiction exists in the CAT and other 
treaties creating extradite or prosecute obligations and analyzes key case studies, based on the 
empirical findings in table 1, in order to show that common examples of universal jurisdiction 
state practice are actually better explained as different types of treaty-based jurisdiction. It also 
proposes a definition of treaty-based jurisdiction and explains its underlying rationale, in order to 
show the difference between this type of jurisdiction and universal jurisdiction.  
A. Only Treaty-Based Jurisdiction Exists in Extradite or Prosecute Obligations 
The jurisdiction implementing the extradite or prosecute obligation in Article 5(2) of the 
CAT, as with all other treaties providing for such regimes, does not expressly require proof of a 
link between a Custodial State and an offense committed by a foreign national abroad (other than 
the presence of the accused and treaty obligation to exercise jurisdiction). This lack of required 
proof is not because it establishes a principle of universal jurisdiction but because the CAT does 
not, in fact, contain a principle of jurisdiction in customary international law at all. The 
territoriality and nationality principles have long been regarded as primary grounds of 
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jurisdiction in international law.284 The pre-eminence of territoriality and nationality jurisdiction 
is reflected in the CAT’s provisions and numerous other treaties that use the Hague formula, both 
of which are mandatory, and are used in parallel to extradite or prosecute provisions.285  
In the CAT, the furthest some states were prepared to accept jurisdiction over a relevant 
offense committed by a foreign national abroad is, by virtue of Article 5(1)(c), when the victim is 
a state’s national.286 This jurisdiction is voluntary and not obligatory. In other treaties, many 
adopted in response to international terrorism, states have been prepared to provide the same 
type of jurisdiction, on a voluntary basis, over particular serious offenses committed by foreign 
nationals abroad where it is necessary to protect their own vital national interests.287 Offenses 
committed against or implicating the state’s sovereignty, political independence, national 
security and governmental functions;288 diplomatic personnel and any other person who enjoys 
status as an internationally protected person and exercises functions on behalf of that state;289 
embassies, diplomatic and consular premises and government facilities;290 nationals;291 and 
registered and government operated flag vessels and aircraft could fall in this category.292  
                                                 
284 Lotus, supra note 20; Arrest Warrant, supra note 2, para. 4 (Guillaume, J., sep. op.). 
285 Supra note 3, Art. 5(1)(a) & (b). For a list of treaties providing for mandatory territoriality and nationality 
jurisdiction, see secretariat survey, supra note 30, para. 112. 
286 As discussed, supra notes 206-07, such crimes are also injurious to the state of nationality  
287 For a list of treaties providing for extraterritorial jurisdiction on a voluntary basis, see secretariat survey, supra 
note 30, para. 112. 
288 E.g., International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, 1316 UNTS 205, Art. 5(1)(c) 
(“Hostages Convention”); Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 16, Art. 6(2)(d); Financing Convention, 
supra note 34, Art. 7(2)(a) & (c); International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, Apr. 
13, 2005, 2445 UNTS 89, Art. 9(2)(d) (“Nuclear Convention”). 
289 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, 1035 UNTS 
167, Art. 3(1)(c), Dec. 14, 1973. 
290 Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 16, Art. 6(2)(b); Financing Convention, supra note 34, Art. 7(2)(b); 
Nuclear Convention, supra note 288, Art. 9(2)(b). 
291 E.g., Hostages Convention, supra note 288, Art. 5(1)(d); Terrorist Bombings Convention, id. Art. 6(2)(a); 
Financing Convention, id. Art. 7(2)(a); Nuclear Convention, id. Art. 9(2)(a);  
292 E.g., Seizure of Aircraft Convention, supra note 32, Art. 4(1)(a); Financing Convention, id. Art. 7(2)(e); Nuclear 
Convention, id. Art. 9(2)(e). 
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Based on the foregoing and the textual analysis in Part IV, the jurisdiction arising out of 
extradite or prosecute obligations may be better understood as a type of treaty-based jurisdiction. 
The interpretation offered here has received some judicial sanction by Judges Higgins et al. in 
the Arrest Warrant.293 The judges in that case study the provisions of certain important treaties 
(including the CAT), the adoption of which, they observe, is asserted in existing scholarship to 
“evidence universality as a ground for the exercise of jurisdiction recognized in international 
law.” They conclude that such treaties do not, in fact, provide for universal jurisdiction.294 The 
judges explain that the parties to these treaties agree to grounds of jurisdiction providing 
important links with the prescribing state. In addition to these grounds of jurisdiction, there are 
“parallel provisions whereby a State party in whose jurisdiction the alleged perpetrator of such 
offenses is found shall prosecute him or extradite him.”295  
The “parallel provisions” referred to in the passage quoted above is jurisdiction arising 
out of treaty obligations to extradite or prosecute. According to the judges, “[b]y the loose use of 
language the latter has come to be referred to as ‘universal jurisdiction’, though this is really an 
obligatory territorial jurisdiction over persons, albeit in relation to acts committed elsewhere.”296 
While the judges were right to suggest that such jurisdiction has been “inaccurately termed” as a 
principle of “universal jurisdiction,” they referred to this treaty-based jurisdiction as “obligatory 
territorial jurisdiction over persons, albeit in relation to acts committed elsewhere.”297 It is 
somewhat misleading to conceptualize this jurisdiction as “territorial jurisdiction.”298 It is not 
possible to found this extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction on the principle of territoriality 
                                                 
293 Supra note 2 (Higgins et al., JJ., joint sep. op.). See also Yousef, supra note 6. 
294 Id., paras. 25-26, 41. The same conclusion is reached by Judge Guillaume, id., paras. 7-15. 
295 Id., para. 41.  
296 Id. 
297 Id., paras. 41-42, 44. See also Yee, supra note 7, para. 8. 
298 O’Keefe, supra note 25, at 742, 755. 
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simply because the alleged offender subsequently enters the territory of the prescribing state.299 
As discussed above, the presence of the accused triggers the Custodial State’s obligation to 
enforce its jurisdiction and to extradite or prosecute. The enforcement of jurisdiction, which is 
strictly territorial, is distinct from jurisdiction to prescribe, which is extraterritorial.300 Only by 
the use of legal fiction would the “obligatory territorial jurisdiction” described by the judges 
perhaps make sense.   
The above interpretation of treaty-based jurisdiction has also found some support in 
scholarship.301 Professor Yee highlights the difficulty of evaluating jurisdiction in treaties 
containing extradite or prosecute obligations due to “[o]ver-exaggerated statements expressing 
support for universal jurisdiction” in existing scholarship and “the controversy surrounding what 
constitutes universal jurisdiction, properly so called.”302 Having undertaken a careful 
examination of treaty practice, Professor Yee argues that there is no support for the claim that 
such treaties embody the existence of universal jurisdiction.303 This is because treaties either 
require that crimes have links to some parties to a particular treaty regime (as in the case of 
treaties that use the Hague formula, such as the CAT) or else a treaty permission or obligation to 
exercise jurisdiction and the presence of the suspect are required (such as the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions).304 For Professor Yee, neither of these situations arising out of treaty practice can 
be properly called “universal jurisdiction.”305 The latter is based solely on the “universal 
concern” over the crime, such that every state in the world has an interest in prosecuting the 
                                                 
299 Id.   
300 UN Doc. A/61/10, supra note 20, para. 9.  
301 Higgins, supra note 7, at 99; Reydams, supra note 7, at 14-21. See also UN Doc. A/CN.4/690, supra note 6, 
paras. 109-16.  
302 Yee, supra note 7, paras. 14-15. 
303 Id., para. 17. 
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perpetrator, and the absence of any jurisdictional link between the prosecuting state and the 
crime at issue.306  
This leaves open the question the type of jurisdiction used to implement extradite or 
prosecute obligations. According to Professor Yee, extradite or prosecute is a “means of 
exercising jurisdiction; it is not jurisdiction itself.”307 For Professor Yee, the obligation does not 
necessarily lead to the finding of a particular ground of jurisdiction itself and may lead to the 
utilization of “all the possible kinds.”308 Therefore, the “pivotal point” is to identify which type 
of jurisdiction (existing in customary international law and stipulated by the relevant treaty 
regime) the obligation is used to implement, such as territoriality, nationality or protection of 
national vital interests.309 The present article departs from Professor Yee and, as will be 
explained, the treaty-based jurisdiction arising out of extradite or prosecute obligations exists 
independently and may be distinguished from principles of jurisdiction in customary 
international law in important ways.  
B. Treaty-Based Jurisdiction: Defining the Basic Concept 
Treaty-based jurisdiction, it is proposed, may be defined as the permission under 
international law to establish jurisdiction over a relevant treaty-offense committed abroad, 
including by the nationals of another party to the treaty regime, in the absence of any other 
lawfully accepted jurisdictional link to the prescribing state at the time of the relevant conduct. 
As treaty-based jurisdiction implements extradite or prosecute obligations, many treaties, 
including treaties utilizing the Hague formula, do not require proof of a special jurisdictional link 
between the relevant offense and the prescribing state. Accordingly, national legislation, enacted 
                                                 
306 Id., paras. 4, 7-8.  
307 Id., para. 17. 
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309 Id., paras. 17-18.  
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to give effect to these treaties, usually makes no mention of the necessity of such links either. 
Conversely, treaty-based jurisdiction has two requirements insofar as jurisdiction to prescribe is 
concerned, both of which serve to limit the scope and application of this type of jurisdiction. 
First, this jurisdiction envisages and expressly requires the presence of the alleged offender in the 
territory of the prescribing state.310 For example, it will be recalled from the textual analysis of 
Article 5(2) of the CAT that the common wording used in the Hague formula provides that a 
party shall “establish its jurisdiction over the offence in the case where the alleged offender is 
present in its territory”. Second, the alleged offender must not be extradited. In the words 
commonly used in the Hague formula, the prescribing state’s jurisdiction applies “if it does not 
extradite him”.311 Equally, national legislation giving effect to these treaties often make mention 
of the necessity of the subsequent presence of the accused in the prescribing state’s territory and 
the suspect is not extradited.  
The establishment of treaty-based jurisdiction (and its enforcement) is mandatory in 
situations where there is an obligation to prosecute alleged offenders who are present in the 
prescribing state’s territory and, for whatever reason, not extradited to another relevant 
jurisdiction with a link to the offense, either in the form of a state party or, for example, an ad 
hoc international312 or regional313 criminal tribunal or a permanent international criminal tribunal 
in the case of the ICC.314   
                                                 
310 See also Arrest Warrant, supra note 2, paras. 57 (Higgins et al., JJ., joint sep. op.), 9, 15 (President Guillaume). 
311 Supra note 3, Art. 5(2).  
312 Infra, notes 388-93. 
313 In the wake of the Habré case, Senegal concluded an agreement with the AU to prosecute Habré in a newly 
established “Extraordinary African Chambers” in order to implement the extradite or prosecute obligation in the 
CAT. See Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Senegal and the AU on the Establishment of 
Extraordinary African Chambers Within the Senegalese Judicial System, (Aug. 22, 2012), at 
http://www.forumchambresafricaines.org/docs/Agreement_AU-Senegal_establishing_AEC.pdf. 
314 ICC Statute, supra note 262, Art. 17.  
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There are various forms of treaty-based jurisdiction and it is not confined to treaties 
creating extradite or prosecute obligations. For example, such jurisdiction may arise from an 
agreement between states, such as the agreement between allied powers at the end of World War 
II to prosecute international crimes committed by persons belonging to a “common enemy”.315 
Treaty-based jurisdiction may also arise out of binding UN Security Council resolutions in 
response to specific situations, with the UN Charter as the ultimate source of legal authority,316 
as well as the Rome Statute of the ICC under the principle of complementarity.317   
C. Treaty-Based Jurisdiction Distinguished from Grounds of Jurisdiction in Custom 
Contrary to the opinion of Professor Yee, treaty-based jurisdiction differs from principles 
of jurisdiction in customary international law in at least two important respects. First, the treaty 
itself provides a sufficient basis in international law for asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction and 
ipso facto creates important links between the Custodial State and a relevant treaty offense 
occurring abroad. As such jurisdiction is based on treaty and limited to the treaty context, unlike 
principles of jurisdiction under general international law, no further evidence of a special link 
between the prescribing state and the crime in issue is needed.318 In fact, a party would be unable 
to fulfil its contractual obligations if treaty-based jurisdiction required specific links with a 
Custodial State to be proven. Although further proof of such a link may be irrelevant, this is not 
“universal jurisdiction”; that is, treaty-based jurisdiction is not the competence of any state to 
prosecute crimes, based on the gravity of the crime alone and for the protection of international 
community values, in the absence of any link at all with the state. States parties to a treaty regime 
agree to the use of treaty-based jurisdiction but not to universal jurisdiction. Second, treaty-based 
                                                 
315 Infra, note 338.  
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jurisdiction is obligatory (and not merely permissive), the exercise of which is triggered by the 
presence of the accused and the failure to extradite to another party to the treaty regime. Thus, 
treaty-based jurisdiction applies inter partes in order to enable a Custodial State to perform its 
contractual obligations vis-a-vis Paragraph 1 States (and to protect the latter’s national vital 
interests implicated by an alleged offense).319 The enforcement of this treaty-based jurisdiction 
by states parties on each other’s behalf, where extradition is not forthcoming, is precisely the 
reason why extradite or prosecute obligations are triggered only upon the accused’s presence in 
the territory of a state party.  
For example, during the proceedings of the Habré case, Eric David, one of the Counsel 
and Advocates of Belgium, asserted in response to Senegal’s refusal to extradite Habré to 
Belgium that, “[f]or Senegal, it is not so much a question of exercising universal jurisdiction as 
one of performing its obligations to prosecute or, failing that, to extradite” to Belgium.320 David 
continued: “[t]herefore, it matters little how we characterize the jurisdiction that Belgium is 
asking Senegal to exercise: what matters is that it exercises that jurisdiction.”321 
D. Rationale of Treaty-Based Jurisdiction 
The purpose of treaty-based jurisdiction is to implement extradite or prosecute 
obligations. Although extradite or prosecute obligations have been included in numerous treaties 
with diverse variations,322 a common feature in the relevant provisions is the concept’s raison 
d’être; that is, to prevent impunity by enabling states parties to a particular treaty regime that 
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have a link with an alleged offense to apprehend and prosecute the accused, or else have a 
prosecution undertaken on their behalf by the Custodial State in whose territory the accused has 
taken refuge. Contrary to the ICJ’s opinion in the Habré case, the reason why states prevent 
impunity is not for the exclusive protection of a “common interest.”323 It is because treaty crimes 
implicate and may even be injurious to certain of their own national vital interests, as 
exemplified by the relevant treaty provisions.324 The underlying rationale of treaty-based 
jurisdiction is therefore seems to be the reciprocal protection of national vital interests. The 
pragmatic and mutually beneficial nature of the obligation, by enabling an “injured” state to have 
offenders surrendered for prosecution, or punished on its behalf by the Custodial State failing 
extradition, is precisely the reason why Grotius first referred to the obligation in the early 
seventeenth century.325    
The CAT’s travaux préparatoires indicate that the rationale for including the extradite or 
prosecute obligation is to make the instrument more effective by enabling Paragraph 1 States, 
primarily under the principles of territoriality and nationality jurisdiction, to obtain custody of 
the accused by placing a duty on the Custodial State to extradite. It was understood that the use 
of the obligation would mean that in “the frequent situations where a regime under which torture 
was practiced is overthrown, and the new regime in the country is anxious to bring the torturers 
to justice, it would be more difficult for the perpetrators to escape the consequences of their acts 
by fleeing to another country.”326 To that end, there was support among the Working Group that 
“an alleged offender should normally be tried by the State in whose territory the offense is 
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324 Supra, notes 286-92.  
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committed.”327 There was an assumption that a Paragraph 1 State, particularly the state in whose 
territory the crime had occurred or whose national had committed the crime abroad, would 
normally exercise its jurisdiction over an alleged offense and remove the immunity of their own 
officials (as opposed to any other state party). This may explain the reason why delegations 
during the negotiation of Article 5(2) gave no consideration, failing extradition by a Custodial 
State, to the issues raised by the removal of the immunity of state officials from the criminal 
jurisdiction of foreign states. It may equally explain the inherent conflict in the CAT between 
such immunity and the requirement that alleged offenders act in an official capacity. The latter 
dilemma did not come to the fore before a national court until more than a decade after the CAT 
had come into force in Pinochet.328  
On the other hand, during the drafting of the CAT delegates recognized that extradition, 
as a sovereign act, is not an absolute obligation.329 Accordingly, the Custodial State, by failing to 
extradite the accused to a Paragraph 1 State, has an obligation to establish its jurisdiction on their 
behalf, in order to prevent the latter from becoming an “injured State” within the meaning of 
Article 42 of the Articles on State Responsibility.330 The ever-present possibility that extradition 
may not be forthcoming is precisely the reason for the mandatory treaty-based jurisdiction 
arising out of the extradite or prosecute obligation and its inclusion in Article 5(2) of the CAT.331 
The above interpretation was envisaged by De Visscher in 1926, long before the obligation to 
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extradite or prosecute was included in modern treaties, during the effort of the League of Nations 
to codify extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction and extradition.332 
1. Protection of the Custodial State’s National Vital Interests 
There is nothing in the CAT or any other treaty providing for extradite or prosecute 
obligations that creates a hierarchy of jurisdiction. Therefore, a Custodial State, in addition to 
being required to protect the national vital interests of other states parties in cases of non-
extradition, is able to assert treaty-based jurisdiction in cases where crimes threaten or implicate 
its own national vital interests. In such a situation, the Custodial State has the ability to assert 
broad extraterritorial jurisdiction without the burden of having to rely on one of the narrower 
grounds of jurisdiction specified in the relevant treaty regime, which would otherwise require 
evidence of a link with the alleged offense or offender. All that has to be proven by the Custodial 
State is the accused’s presence and the failure to extradite to another party. The wording of 
Article 5(2) of the CAT does not limit such an interpretation of treaty-based jurisdiction; and, 
indeed, it reflects the way in which the CAT and other treaties have been implemented in state 
practice.333  
2. Preventing Impunity  
There is little doubt that universal jurisdiction and the treaty-based jurisdiction contained 
in extradite or prosecute obligations both have the purpose of preventing impunity. However, the 
latter’s rationale is to prevent the impunity of crimes that have important links with one or more 
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states parties to the particular treaty regime. In that regard, the Custodial State prosecutes the 
offense on behalf of a state that has such a link, and not solely as an agent of the international 
community. There is no evidence to suggest, either by virtue of the operative provisions of such 
treaties or based on the way in which they have been implemented in conreto, that they are 
concerned with the exclusive protection of international community values.334 Of course, treaties 
that contain crimes under international law and protect human rights in time of peace or armed 
conflict (such as the 1949 Geneva Conventions and CAT) means that states, in implementing 
extradite or prosecute obligations, may also protect, either indirectly or incidentally, some of the 
same international community values as the principle of universal jurisdiction. As a prerequisite, 
the types of international community values falling within universal jurisdiction’s scope require 
agreement among states. The extent to which extradite or prosecute obligations protect the same 
values as universal jurisdiction, which is far from clear, does not warrant treating the two 
concepts as one and the same.335  
The interpretation of treaty-based jurisdiction arising out of extradite or prosecute 
obligations and its underlying rationale is not only consistent with the facts of the Habré case but 
is supported by the few examples of the way in which treaty obligations have been implemented 
and state practice with regard to international crimes generally. 
E. Typology of Treaty-Based Jurisdiction: Case Studies 
Informed by the empirical findings in table 1, this final section analyzes key case studies 
which show that common examples of universal jurisdiction state practice are actually better 
explained as different types of treaty-based jurisdiction. The types of treaty-based jurisdiction 
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considered are: prosecutions relating to World War II, prosecutions with a treaty’s support, 
prosecution of a resident who cannot be extradited, and prosecution under a general treaty. 
1. Historical Prosecutions Relating to World War II 
The first typology concerns crimes committed during the period of World War II, all of 
which are context specific and were tried ex-post facto (table 1). All of these trials stem from 
landmark treaties concluded by allied powers at the end of the war, which determine the types of 
conduct deemed to be criminalized under international law, including “war crimes”, and limit 
jurisdiction to such crimes to the period of the war in which they were engaged, by persons 
belonging to a “common enemy”, that were injurious to allied states and their nationals.336 These 
trials have been almost unanimously claimed by scholars as evidence of universal jurisdiction, 
with Eichmann being cited more than any other.337 And yet, it has been overlooked time and 
again that Israel’s domestic law, titled “The Law for Meting out Justice to Nazis and their 
Collaborators”, did not provide for universal jurisdiction.338 It was limited temporally to crimes 
committed during the period of World War II and by persons belonging to a common enemy (the 
Nazi regime) or in an enemy country. It was also concerned with “crimes against the Jewish 
people.” The domestic law of Israel was thus subject to the same jurisdictional limitations as that 
of the other Allies at the end of the war.339 As Eichmann was charged with crimes against Jews, 
the District Court in that case found that the extraterritorial application of Israel’s domestic law 
was based on the protective principle of jurisdiction, a decision with which the Supreme Court 
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was in full agreement.340 The statement by the District and Supreme Courts that jurisdiction 
could also be justified on the basis of universal jurisdiction was little more than dictum.341 In all 
likelihood, the fact that the District and Supreme Courts invoked universal jurisdiction and 
proclaimed to prosecute Eichmann “merely as the organ and agent of the international 
community”342 was because Israeli agents had abducted Eichmann from Argentina without first 
seeking the approval of the Argentinian authorities. In reaction to the covert operation, Argentina 
complained before the UN Security Council that its sovereignty had been violated.343 In any 
event, neither the District nor the Supreme Court provided any evidence of state practice to 
support the existence of universal jurisdiction or its applicability over war crimes or any of the 
other crimes with which Eichmann was charged. The dictum of a domestic court does not create 
a customary rule. Caution is due when assessing the evidentiary value of precedents such as 
Eichmann.344  
In the Sixth Committee debate on universal jurisdiction, the Israeli delegation does not 
recognize Eichmann as an example of universal jurisdiction, no less a historical precedent, or the 
inclusion of this jurisdiction in its domestic law over any crime.345 Moreover, a conceptual 
distinction is made between jurisdiction arising out of treaty obligations to extradite or prosecute, 
for which provision is made in the domestic law of Israel – “even if the person committing the 
offense is not an Israeli citizen or resident and irrespective of where the offense was committed” 
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– and universal jurisdiction.346 The Israeli delegation does not question the existence of a 
customary rule of universal jurisdiction, perhaps unsurprising in light of the judicial dicta in 
Eichmann, and, instead, emphasizes that there are too many “uncertainties” regarding the legal 
status, definition and scope of universal jurisdiction that are essential for states to agree on before 
it is applied in practice.347  
In addition to the practice of Israel, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the interest of a 
small number of states in the prosecution of war crimes was revived after it became apparent that 
numerous Nazi war criminals from World War II had subsequently acquired citizenship in these 
respective countries, which included France, Canada, Australia and Britain. This is not helped by 
the fact that several of these states claimed that they were justified in enacting legislation for the 
prosecution of war crimes on the basis of universal jurisdiction. For example, two of the seven 
judges of the High Court of Australia in Polyukhovich referred in their dicta to the existence of 
universal jurisdiction over war crimes and crimes under international law.348 It seems to have 
been forgotten by these states that they had not actually used universal jurisdiction at the end of 
World War II. In any event, the legislation enacted by these states is limited to crimes by persons 
belonging to a common enemy during the period of the Second World War, in which these states 
had been engaged, and who are subsequently residing in the territory of the prosecuting state. 
Thus, the legislative provisions, and the few trials brought under them, are not based on universal 
jurisdiction.349 Rather, they are an extension of the practice of the same Allies at the end of the 
World War II (with the additional qualification that suspects are subsequently resident in the 
                                                 
346 Id.  
347 UN GAOR, 71st Sess., 14th mtg., paras. 7-10 (Israel), UN Doc. A/C.6/71/SR.14 (Oct. 31, 2016). 
348 Polyukhovich, supra note 54, paras. 32 (Brennan, J.), 21-35 (Toohey, J.). 
349 E.g., Fédération Nationale des Déportés et Internes Resistants et Patriotes v. Barbie (Cass., Oct. 6, 1983), 78 ILR 
124 (1988); R v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701; R v. Sawoniuk [2000] EWCA Crim 9 (Feb. 10, 2000). 
75 
 
prosecuting state).350 In addition to jurisdiction developing out of the practice of allied powers at 
the end of World War II, treaty-based jurisdiction was subsequently incorporated into the 1949 
Geneva Conventions, which became the foundation of modern international humanitarian law.  
1949 Geneva Conventions 
One extradite or prosecute regime that is different to the Hague formula is that contained 
in the “grave breaches” of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Article 85(1) of the First 
Additional Protocol to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.351 Unlike treaties that use the Hague 
formula, the grave breaches require states parties to prosecute alleged offenders present in their 
custody, failing extradition to another party, whose disputed acts have no express jurisdictional 
link to that or any other state party. As the jurisdiction of the prosecuting state party appears, at 
least at first sight, to be based solely on the mere presence of the accused, this has led some 
states, the ICRC and numerous scholars to read these latter provisions as the first treaty-based 
embodiment of universal jurisdiction.352  
Even where a particular treaty does not use the Hague formula and therefore does not 
expressly require that a crime has a jurisdictional link to one or more of the parties, this should 
not be automatically interpreted as establishing a principle of universal jurisdiction.353 In their 
Joint Separate Opinion in the Arrest Warrant case, Judges Higgins et al. commented on the grave 
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breaches and suggested that “[n]o territorial or nationality linkage is envisaged, suggesting a true 
universality principle.”354 On the other hand, the judges suggested that no case has touched upon 
the “jurisdictional possibilities” of the Geneva Conventions and remains to be judicially 
tested.355 It is submitted that treaties such as the Geneva Conventions are more persuasively 
interpreted as a form of treaty-based jurisdiction as opposed to universal jurisdiction. This is 
indicated for two reasons.  
Drafting History  
First, the drafters of the Geneva Conventions never contemplated universal jurisdiction. 
Britain had a profound influence on the development of the laws of war and opposed the 
codification of war crimes and criminal sanctions for violations of the laws of war (including 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over such crimes) in existing customary international law 
generally.356 Consequently, the compromise among delegations was that these conventions are 
much more limited in scope and instead prohibit certain conduct as “grave breaches” and provide 
only for an obligation to extradite or prosecute alleged offenders. It follows that the grave 
breaches do not codify principles of jurisdiction in existing customary international law.357 This 
is reaffirmed by the fact that the Geneva Conventions were adopted less than a year after the 
Genocide Convention. The drafters of the Genocide Convention rejected the inclusion of 
universal jurisdiction as it would go “against the traditional principles of international law and … 
might therefore create dangerous international tensions.”358 
Historical Context 
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Second, the grave breaches are an early formulation of the obligation to extradite or 
prosecute, using imprecise and broadly worded language, which was repeated with greater clarity 
in subsequent treaties that use the Hague formula.359 As has already been shown elsewhere, the 
grave breaches have to be read in their proper historical context and in the light of state practice 
and the records of the United Nations War Crimes Commission at the end of World War II.360 
The grave breaches were adopted in order to counter (in future armed conflicts) a number of 
serious inter-related problems experienced by the Allies at the end of the war. On the one hand, 
the jurisdiction of Allies injured by violations of the laws of war was limited ratione temporis to 
the period of the war and rationae personae to persons belonging to a “common enemy.”361 On 
the other, the Allies were either unwilling and/or unable due to inadequate domestic laws to 
prosecute their own or each other’s nationals for such violations committed against the enemy.362 
At the same time, many alleged offenders had taken refuge abroad, particularly in neutral 
countries.363 The latter did not have domestic laws criminalizing violations of the laws of war.364 
Moreover, the Allied and neutral states in whose territories alleged offenders had taken refuge 
were often unwilling to cooperate and extradite them to the states injured by such violations and 
they had no legal obligation to do so.365   
A careful reading of the actual text of the grave breaches and various other primary 
sources, most notably archival records and records of the Diplomatic Conference leading to the 
adoption of the Geneva Conventions and the authoritative article-by-article commentary of 
Pictet, reveals the “novel character” of the grave breaches. First, they place an obligation on all 
                                                 
359 Arrest Warrant, supra note 2, para. 30 (Higgins et al., JJ., joint sep. op.). 
360 Garrod (2012), supra note 9, at 810-12; Reydams, supra note 7, at 17-18; Reydams, supra note 8, at 11-12.  
361 Garrod (2012), id. at 779-83. 
362 Id.  
363 Id.  
364 Id. 
365 Id.  
78 
 
states parties (including neutrals) to criminalize certain conduct as “grave breaches” and, second, 
require them to prosecute alleged offenders found on their territory if there is a failure to hand 
over alleged offenders “to another High Contracting Party concerned.”366 During the Diplomatic 
Conference, a proposal to limit the obligation to search for and bring to trial alleged offenders, 
failing extradition to a “Party concerned,” to the parties to an armed conflict was withdrawn after 
it was explained that the “principle of universality applied.”367 This reference to “universality” in 
the preparatory work does not mean the principle of universal jurisdiction proper, as is often 
assumed.368 It means that the above obligation to extradite or prosecute applies to all parties, 
regardless of whether they are belligerents or neutrals, and that such an obligation does not 
violate a state’s neutrality. The broadly worded language used by the grave breaches, “regardless 
of their nationality,” means that parties are not permitted to limit the scope of their extradite or 
prosecute obligation to persons found on their territory who are regarded as belonging to the 
enemy. The obligation includes their own nationals, as well as the nationals of their Allies and 
neutrals.  
It is a non sequitur to read a Custodial State’s jurisdiction in the grave breaches as being 
based on the mere presence of the accused. Rather, jurisdiction has its basis in treaty, which must 
be enforced when an alleged offender is found on its territory and is not extradited to a “Party 
concerned” (that is, if a meaningful link exists between the offense and the state requesting 
extradition).369 Therefore, in situations of non-extradition, a Custodial State is required to initiate 
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criminal proceedings against alleged offenders on behalf of a “Party concerned.” The reason why 
the grave breaches do not expressly require a jurisdictional link to some of the parties to the 
Geneva Conventions is because such breaches were ipso facto regarded as injurious to one or 
more of the parties to an armed conflict. Hence, the grave breaches used the broad language 
“Party concerned.” 
2. Prosecutions Pursuant to Treaty Obligations to Extradite or Prosecute 
The second typology concerns crimes in violation of treaties providing for extradite or 
prosecute obligations. As discussed above, these obligations give rise to treaty-based jurisdiction, 
which has important links with one or more parties to the relevant treaty-regime and the crime at 
issue. States have asserted jurisdiction and undertaken prosecutions pursuant to these obligations 
in one of two situations. First, where the offense in question implicates or affects a state party’s 
nationals (or residents) and/or national vital interests. This is precisely what has occurred, for 
example, in the practice of Spain – one of the so-called pioneers of universal jurisdiction. 
Spanish practice  
The Spanish delegation has stated that Pinochet “became a model for the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction in Spain.”370 However, Pinochet had nothing to do with the principle of 
universal jurisdiction proper. Spain requested Pinochet’s extradition from the Custodial State – 
the U.K. – and claimed that it had “universal jurisdiction.” Yet, Spain was essentially a 
Paragraph 1 State under the CAT on the ground that more than 50 Spanish nationals had been 
among the victims of alleged torture committed in Chile, which was held by Spain’s National 
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Court Criminal Division to give Spain a “legitimate interest in the exercise of such jurisdic-
tion.”371 Why, then, did Spain claim “universal jurisdiction”? 
The national law of Spain, as it then existed, provided that “Spanish jurisdiction is 
competent to try acts committed by Spaniards and foreigners outside the national territory” for 
crimes “under Spanish law,” including crimes that “under international treaties and agreements, 
must be prosecuted in Spain.”372 Thus, Spain regarded ratified treaties (including treaties 
containing extradite or prosecute obligations) as either permitting or requiring Spain to exercise 
“universal jurisdiction” (even in situations where a crime is linked to a Spanish national interest 
or victim). The interpretation of jurisdiction in treaty obligations to extradite or prosecute as 
“universal jurisdiction” may have been because, until 2009, jurisdiction over crimes committed 
abroad based on the nationality of the victim was unknown in Spain’s domestic law.373 This 
would suggest that Spain had previously justified the extraterritorial application of its domestic 
law based on “universal jurisdiction” (to the extent that such jurisdiction was deemed to exist 
conceptually and legally in Spain’s domestic legal and constitutional system) as comporting with 
international law. It did so by interpreting treaties as a legal source of authority for universal 
jurisdiction.374 Spain also appears to have relied on its own domestic law in order to identify the 
existence of universal jurisdiction in customary international law. This methodology puts the cart 
before the horse, as it passes over the underlying question whether the state is permitted by 
international law to exercise universal jurisdiction and, if so, over what crimes.  
                                                 
371 Pinochet (No. 1), supra note 118, at 903 (Lord Slynn); UN Committee against Torture, Marcos Roitman 
Rosenmann v. Spain, Communication No. 176/2000, paras. 2(3), 6(7), UN Doc. CAT/C/28/D/176/2000 (Apr. 30, 
2002). 
372 LEY ORGÁNICA DEL PODER JUDICIAL [L.O.P.J.] [LAW ON THE JUDICIARY], Art. 23(4).  
373 Guatemalan Generals, S.T.C. No. 237/2005, Sep. 26, 2005, 8 Y.B. INT’L H.L. 507 (2005) (Eng. trans.); Note 
submitted to Office of Legal Affairs (Spain), supra note 370, at 2, 8-9. 
374 Note submitted to Office of Legal Affairs (Spain), id. at 1-2, 5, 8-11. 
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In the Guatemalan Generals case, involving an attack on a Spanish embassy and its 
employees and a Spanish ambassador, as well as crimes committed against Spanish nationals in 
Guatemala, the Constitutional Court held that Spain’s domestic law “establishes a principle of 
absolute universal jurisdiction” and that it is “quite debatable” whether international law requires 
a connection with Spanish national interests in order for Spain to exercise such jurisdiction.375 
While the Constitutional Court may have been correct in pointing out that Spain’s domestic law 
did not envisage proof of such a link, nonetheless, the court was not able to show, beyond 
asserting that there are a “multitude of precedents in international law,” that the legislation in 
question conformed with international law and, indeed, that the same “principle of absolute 
universal jurisdiction” existed in international law.376 It is clear that the Constitutional Court 
treated universal jurisdiction proper (to the extent that it was deemed to exist in custom) and 
treaty-based jurisdiction arising out of extradite or prosecute obligations as one and the same. 
In any event, Spain has only been willing to exercise “universal jurisdiction” in cases 
where Spanish nationals and/or national vital interests have been implicated by an offense. This 
includes the Scilingo case—the only “universal jurisdiction” case in Spain to go to trial (table 
1)—involving more than six hundred victims of Spanish nationality, during Argentina’s military 
dictatorship between 1976 and 1983.377 In the light of Spanish practice, in its submission to the 
sixty-eighth session of the Sixth Committee, the Spanish delegation conceded that, with regard to 
the “significant number of cases based on the principle of universal jurisdiction” in Spanish 
practice since the mid-1990s, “[i]n a number of those cases, the victims of the crimes reported 
                                                 
375 S.T.C. No. 237/2005, supra note 373, paras. 3, 6. 
376 Id., para. 6. 
377 Scilingo, S.T.S. No. 1362/2004, Nov. 15, 2004, 7 Y.B. INT’L H.L. 594 (2004) (Eng. trans.); Scilingo, Decision 
No. 16/2005, Apr. 19, 2005, 8 Y.B. INT’L H.L. 498, 504-05 (2005) (Eng. trans.). See also Anonymous 
Commentator, The Spanish Indictment of High-Ranking Rwandan Officials, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1003 (2008). 
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were Spanish citizens.”378 In any event, Spain amended its domestic law in 2009 so that its 
extraterritorial application requires the existence of “a relevant link with Spain.”379 As pointed 
out by Spain during the Sixth Committee, “it is no longer possible to speak” of universal 
jurisdiction in Spain. 
Prosecution on Residents of Prosecuting State 
The second situation in which states have prosecuted crimes pursuant to treaty 
obligations to extradite or prosecute is where suspects have been present in the prosecuting 
state’s territory and could not be extradited to another party due to the relevant treaty regime 
related to the crime at issue. In this latter situation, the Custodial State has an obligation to 
initiate criminal proceedings, failing extradition, on behalf of a party that has such a link. In most 
of these trials, the suspects were residents of the prosecuting state and their own state of 
nationality was supportive of prosecution (as suspects were former state officials or officials of a 
former regime that had been overthrown) but was unwilling to request extradition, or extradition 
was not legally or practically possible. This is illustrated, for example, by the practice of the 
Netherlands.  
The Netherlands practice  
Nzapali concerned the trial of a national of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(“DRC”) for torture who was serving as colonel of the Garde Civile of the DRC (table 1).380 
Nzapali fled to the Netherlands and resided there for several years after the existing regime to 
which he belonged was overthrown. Since Nzapali could not be extradited to the DRC due to a 
                                                 
378 Note submitted to Office of Legal Affairs (Spain), supra note 131, para. 15. 
379 UN secretary-general report, The Scope and Application of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, para. 25, UN 
Doc. A/68/113 (2013). 
380 PROSECUTOR V. N, Case No. AO7178 (Rotterdam Dist. Ct., Apr. 7, 2004), in 51 NETHERLANDS INT'L L. 
REV. 439, 444-49 (2004) (Eng. trans.); Ward Ferdinandusse, International Decision: Prosecutor v. N, 99 AJIL 686 
(2005). 
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real risk of being subject to torture by the successive government, the Netherlands had an 
obligation, pursuant to the CAT, to initiate criminal proceedings against him. The Netherlands 
essentially tried Nzapali on behalf of a Paragraph 1 State, the DRC, which assisted in the 
gathering of evidence for his trial. Moreover, Nzapali had already been convicted in his home 
country, in absentia, for abuse of authority and other relevant crimes. In a similar vein, the 
prosecution of 3 Afghans (table 1) concern suspects residing in the Netherlands and involved 
allegations of torture and war crimes, which, in the opinion of Dutch courts, the Netherlands has 
an international legal obligation to investigate, failing extradition, pursuant to relevant treaties.381 
In re Bouterse, the Dutch Supreme Court had to decide whether Dutch courts could assert 
jurisdiction, pursuant to the Torture Convention Implementation Act, over Desiré Bouterse – the 
leader of a military regime in Suriname – for alleged torture committed against military 
opponents during a coup d’état, led by Bouterse, in 1980.382 The Supreme Court held that the 
CAT establishes “universal jurisdiction” but dismissed the complaint against Bouterse on the 
grounds that such jurisdiction could be asserted only in cases with a link to the Netherlands, such 
as the presence of the suspect (as is required by Article 5(2) of the CAT), and, in any event, the 
acts were not criminalized as such in the Netherlands at the time they were allegedly 
committed.383 The Dutch legislature subsequently followed this approach in the adoption of the 
2003 International Crimes Act, which implements the Rome Statute of the ICC and criminalizes 
war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity and torture, although assertions of jurisdiction 
over these crimes is dependent upon the presence of the accused in the Netherlands. This 
                                                 
381 Hesam & Jalalzoy, Case No. 09/751005-04 (The Hague, Dist. Ct., Oct. 14, 2005), at http://www.rechtspraak.nl; 
Case No. 07/10064 (Netherlands S. Ct., Jul. 8, 2008), at id; Abdullah Faqirzada, Case No. 09/03090 (Netherlands S. 
Ct., Nov. 8, 2011), at http://www.internationalcrimesdatabase.org/Case/1000/Faqirzada/. 
382 Prosecutor-General of the Supreme Court v. Desiré Bouterse, Case No. LJN: AB1471, Judgment, Sep. 18, 2001, 
S .Ct. of the Netherlands. This case is reported in 32 NETH. Y.B. INT’L L 282 (2001) (Eng. trans.). 
383 Id., para. 8.5. 
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legislation is an example of treaty-based jurisdiction, implementing treaty obligations to 
prosecute alleged offenders present in the Netherlands, failing extradition to the ICC or another 
state party to a relevant treaty regime, and not an example of universal jurisdiction proper. In 
light of the Supreme Court’s judgment in Bouterse, however, the Netherlands delegation has 
stated that the trials in table 1 “were premised on universal criminal jurisdiction.”384  
3. Prosecutions Under General Treaty: Crimes Arising out of Internal Armed 
Conflicts in the Territories of the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
 
The final typology concerns prosecutions of Former Yugoslavs and Rwandans under a 
general treaty, in this case the UN Charter, in the implementation of legally binding UN Security 
Council resolutions (table 1).385 These resolutions establish ad hoc international criminal 
tribunals with a mandate to prosecute crimes arising out of armed conflicts in the Former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The tribunals have limited territorial, personal and temporal 
jurisdiction.386 Therefore, universal jurisdiction is not envisaged. The tribunals are given 
“primacy” over domestic courts,387 while “all” other states have an obligation to cooperate with 
them, including by taking “measures necessary under their domestic law” to proscribe and 
provide for jurisdiction over relevant crimes falling under the mandate of the tribunals.388 States 
are further required to search for suspects present on their territory and defer to the tribunals by 
transferring suspects to them for prosecution.389 Alternatively, the tribunals may refer cases to 
                                                 
384 Note submitted to Office of Legal Affairs (the Netherlands) (Jul. 1, 2010), at 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/65/ScopeAppUniJuri_StatesComments/Netherlands.pdf. 
385 SC Res. 827 (May 25, 1993); SC Res. 955 (Nov. 8, 1994). 
386 Updated Statute of the ICTY, Arts. 1-8 (Sep. 2009), at http://www.icty.org/sid/135 (“ICTY Statute”); Statute of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Arts. 1-7 (Jan. 2010), at 
http://unictr.unmict.org/sites/unictr.org/files/legal-library/100131_Statute_en_fr_0.pdf (“ICTR Statute”). 
387 ICTY Statute, id. Art. 9; ICTR Statute, id. Art. 8. 
388 SC Res. 827, supra note 385, para. 4; SC Res. 955, supra note 385, para. 2.  
389 E.g., Tadić, supra note 352; ICTR Press Release, Alfred Musema transferred to Arusha (May 21, 1997), at 
http://unictr.unmict.org/en/news/alfred-musema-transferred-arusha; ICTR Press Release, Lieutenant Colonel 
Muvunyi transferred to ICTR Arusha (Oct. 30, 2000), at http://unictr.unmict.org/en/news/lieutenant-colonel-
muvunyi-transferred-ictr-arusha; ICTR Press Release, Ngirabatware Transferred to Arusha (Oct. 8, 2008), at 
http://unictr.unmict.org/en/news/ngirabatware-transferred-arusha. 
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states for trial instead of having them transferred.390 In the absence of the transfer of suspects to 
the tribunals or to the states in whose territory the crimes had occurred, a Custodial State has an 
obligation to prosecute. This explains why Former Yugoslavs and Rwandans represent the 
highest proportion of trials in table 1. Council resolutions essentially establish an obligatory 
extradite or prosecute regime; therefore, the jurisdiction used by states may be conceptualized as 
a type of treaty-based jurisdiction. 
The prosecution of Former Yugoslavs and Rwandans is interpreted by scholars and the 
European Court of Human Rights as evidence of universal jurisdiction state practice.391 In 
support of this interpretation, scholars cite Professor Reydams.392 Professor Reydams’ reasoning 
is that relevant Council resolutions require states to search for and try suspects present in their 
territory for relevant crimes falling under the mandate of relevant tribunals, including grave 
breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and that the grave braches provisions implement 
universal jurisdiction.393 However, since at least 2010, Professor Reydams has reversed his 
position and argued that the grave breaches provisions and the prosecutions pursuant to them are 
not examples of universal jurisdiction.394  
In all of the trials in table 1, the suspects were residents in the prosecuting states and 
extradition to the states where the crimes had been committed was legally, if not practically, 
                                                 
390 E.g., In re Jorgic´, 135 ILR 152 (Germany); Prosecutor v. Bucyibaruta, Request for Referral to France, Case No. 
ICTR-2005-85-I (Nov. 20, 2007); Prosecutor v. Munyeshyaka, Request for Referral to France, Case No. ICTR-
2005-87-I (Nov. 20, 2007); Mpambara Will Not Be Tried in the Netherlands, Hague Justice Portal (Oct. 21, 2008, at 
www.haguejusticeportal.net/eCache/DEF/9/915.html. For relevant practice in the Netherlands, see OPENBAAR 
MINISTERIE (visited Aug. 25, 2017), at https://www.om.nl/onderwerpen/international-crimes-0/what-cases-have-
been/rwanda/. 
391 E.g., Jorgic´ v. Germany, No. 74613/01 (Jul. 12, 2007), para. 68, ECHR 2007-III; Kaleck, supra note 116; 
O’Keefe, supra note 41, at 814; Luc Reydams, Nyonteze v. Public Prosecutor, 96 AJIL 231, 236 (2002); Scharf, 
supra note 50, at 281. 
392 E.g., Langer, supra note 50, at 4, 13, 28.  
393 E.g., Reydams, supra note 391.  
394 Reydams, supra note 7, at 22-24 & note 35; Reydams, supra note 8.  
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impossible.395 The latter states often acquiesced or supported prosecution, so long as they were 
officials of overthrown regimes and not incumbent officials.396 For example, the four trials 
undertaken by Belgium (table 1) all involve Rwandan suspects and the implementation of 
binding council resolutions. Belgium has an additional link because the crimes had occurred in 
Rwanda - a former Belgian colony - and the suspects had acquired residence in Belgium and 
could not be transferred to the ICTR, while the successive Rwandan Government supported the 
prosecutions.397 Belgian nationals had also been killed during the genocide. Therefore, 
Belgium’s exercise of jurisdiction is far from universal. It is perhaps of no surprise that, out of a 
handful of states that have prosecuted crimes committed in Rwanda, Belgium has undertaken the 
most prosecutions.  
The prosecution of Former Yugoslavs and Rwandans in the other states in table 1 are not 
any different to the practice of Belgium; all of them involve close links between the crime in 
issue and the prosecuting state.398 For example, in Jorgić, the defendant—a Former Yugoslav—
had been legal resident in Germany for a long time, including at the time when crimes in Bosnia 
were committed, and the German Constitutional Court held that universal jurisdiction “required 
                                                 
395 Various factors leading to a bar in extradition include the absence of an extradition agreement; fair trial concerns; 
real risk of human rights violations; and, until it was abolished in 2007, the death penalty for certain categories of 
ginocidaires in the domestic law of Rwanda (ORGANIC LAW NO. 31/2007, Jul. 25, 2007).  
396 E.g., Knesević, supra note 368; Nyonteze v. Public Prosecutor (Tribunal militaire de cassation, Apr. 27, 2001), in 
96 AJIL 231 (2002) (Eng. trans.); Prosecution v. Refic Saric (S. Ct., Nov. 25, 1994, at 
www.internationalcrimesdatabase.org/Case/743/Saric/; Public Prosecutor v. Misrad Repak (Dist. Ct., Dec. 2, 2008), 
at www.icrc.org/ihl-nat/0/45061A413067E31CC125755C004A5773; Public Prosecutor v. Sadi Bugingo (Dist. Ct., 
Feb. 14, 2013, at   
www.internationalcrimesdatabase.org/Case/919/Bugingo/; Dicker, supra note 129, at 234.  
397 Ntezimana et al. (Butare Four) (Cour d’assises, Bruxelles, 2001); Nzabonimana et al. (Cour d’assises, Bruxelles, 
Jun. 29, 2005); Ntuyahaga (Cour d’assises, Bruxelles, Jun. 29, 2007). See also Note submitted to Office of Legal 
Affairs (Belgium), supra note 171, para. 18. 
398 In respect of the Netherlands, see Yvonne N, Case No. LJN: BZ8710 (The Hague Dist. Ct., Mar. 1, 2013), at 
https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI%3ANL%3ARBDHA%3A2013%3A8710; 
Joseph M, Case No. LJN: 12/04592 (S. Ct. Nov. 26, 2013), at 
https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI%3ANL%3AHR%3A2013%3A1420. 
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some sensible nexus with Germany”.399 In the trial of a Former Yugoslav by Denmark is based 
on a provision of the Criminal Code implementing treaty and Council resolution obligations in 
which “Denmark is obliged to have criminal jurisdiction” when a suspect is present in 
Denmark.400 This trial and the legislation on which it is based are not recognized by the Danish 
delegation as examples of universal jurisdiction. As with Denmark, the legislation of Norway 
does not provide for universal jurisdiction. Rather, it provides for extraterritorial jurisdiction over 
certain crimes committed abroad, by foreign nationals, where they are subsequently residents of 
Norway or if Norway has an obligation to provide for such jurisdiction in the implementation of 
international legal obligations.401 Thus, the single trial of a Former Yugoslav (table 1) is not 
recognized by the Norwegian delegation as an example of universal jurisdiction either. The 
Canadian delegation, despite approving the existence of universal jurisdiction in custom in 
respect of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, has not recognized provision for 
such jurisdiction in its domestic law, or Canada’s trial of a Rwandan (table 1) as an example of 
universal jurisdiction.402 The national law of Canada, the “Crimes Against Humanity and War 
Crimes Act,” provides that a person may be prosecuted in Canada for specified crimes 
committed abroad: (a) if at the time of the offense the person was a Canadian citizen or a citizen 
of a state engaged in armed conflict against Canada, or the victim was a Canadian citizen or a 
citizen of a state allied with Canada in an armed conflict; or (b) if, after the time of the offense 
was committed, the person is present in Canada.403 The wording of sub-paragraph (b) is intended 
                                                 
399 Supra note 390, at 156, 166. 
400 Note submitted to Office of Legal Affairs (Denmark) (visited Jun. 23, 2017), at 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/65/ScopeAppUniJuri_StatesComments/Denmark.pdf. 
401 Note submitted to Office of Legal Affairs (Norway) (May 7, 2010), at 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/65/ScopeAppUniJuri_StatesComments/Norway.pdf. 
402 Statement by Permanent Mission of Canada to the UN, The Scope and Application of the Principle of Universal 
Jurisdiction (Oct. 17, 2013), at https://papersmart.unmeetings.org/media2/433370/canada-canz-e-86.pdf. 
403 S.C. 2000, c. 24, sec. 8. 
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to implement international legal obligations binding on Canada, such as treaty obligations to 
extradite or prosecute and council resolutions. Thus, in Munyaneza, the first case to be tried 
under this legislation (table 1),404 the suspect resided in Canada and there was an obligation for 
Canada to act in concert with council obligations. The Superior Court in this case did not 
acknowledge the applicability of universal jurisdiction.405 
On the other hand, the Swiss delegation has interpreted its domestic law as providing for 
universal jurisdiction and the single trial of a Rwandan (table 1) for war crimes as an example of 
so-called “conditional” or “limited” universal jurisdiction.406 However, national law requires the 
existence of a “close link” with Switzerland.407 On closer analysis, “universal jurisdiction” 
appears to be treaty-based jurisdiction by a different name. For example, the Swiss delegation 
suggests that the obligation to extradite or prosecute in treaties “is inextricably linked to the 
principle of universal jurisdiction” and that the assertion of universal jurisdiction can be an 
“obligation” as a result of international legal obligations.408 Moreover, such jurisdiction is 
subject to the twin conditions that the suspect is present in Swiss territory and has not been 
extradited to another jurisdiction.409 
The national laws of states implementing council resolutions and the trials brought under 
them are not examples of proper universal jurisdiction because there is an objective link and a 
mandate from a legitimate international authority. In effect, these states are undertaking 
prosecutions in concert with and on behalf of the tribunals in the completion of their mandates 
and the states in whose territories the crimes had been committed.  
                                                 
404 R v. Munyaneza [2009] QCCS 2201. 
405 Id.  
406 Note submitted to Office of Legal Affairs (Switzerland), (Apr. 26, 2010) at 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/65/ScopeAppUniJuri_StatesComments/Switzerland_E.pdf. 
407 Id. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The assertion that treaty obligations to extradite or prosecute impliedly embody or permit 
a principle of “universal jurisdiction” is not a new one, but it is one that, at the present time, is 
gaining ground, particularly in the light of the Habré case. The present contribution, having 
critically examined the evidence upon which supporters of universal jurisdiction have relied, 
shows that such obligations are incapable of permitting or mandating universal jurisdiction. This 
finding is further corroborated by empirical evidence and the way in which these obligations 
have been implemented in concreto since the end of World War II to the present. It proposes that 
jurisdiction arising out of extradite or prosecute obligations is better conceptualized as “treaty-
based jurisdiction.”  
On the basis of the above assessment, a number of conclusions are merited. 
First, the ICJ’s passing reference to Article 5(2) of the CAT as “universal jurisdiction,” 
regardless of what was actually meant by the term, is potentially misleading and should be 
followed, if at all, with caution in the future. Contrary to the ICJ’s opinion, extradition and 
prosecution are equal international obligations under the CAT. The Custodial State’s obligation 
to prosecute only arises when the obligation to extradite to a Paragraph 1 State (that is, a state 
that has made out a prima facie link with the crime at issue) is not fulfilled. The purpose of 
extradite or prosecute obligations is to enable Paragraph 1 States to obtain the custody of the 
accused, or have such persons prosecuted on their behalf, failing extradition. Thus, in Habré, 
Chad removed Habré’s immunity to allow criminal proceedings to be initiated in Belgium and 
cooperated closely with Belgium by allowing the latter’s public authorities to gather evidence on 
its territory. The same point applies, for example, to Afghanistan in relation to the prosecution of 
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Zardad in the UK410  and to the DRC in connection with the prosecution of Nzapali in the 
Netherlands.411  
Second, national laws implementing treaty obligations to extradite or prosecute and the 
few trials conducted on the basis of them should not be referred to as “universal jurisdiction” or 
used as evidence to infer the existence of universal jurisdiction. This is so for three key reasons. 
First, it gives a misleading and inaccurate empirical picture of state practice and the status of 
universal jurisdiction in customary international law. Second, the characterization of treaty 
obligations to extradite or prosecute as universal jurisdiction is fraught with conceptual 
difficulties and does not correspond with the actual text of treaties or state practice. Third, it 
leads to inter-state tensions as to what constitutes universal jurisdiction and how its scope and 
application should be defined. In this connection, there is a risk that interpreting treaties as 
support for universal jurisdiction could result in excessive—and unlawful—claims of jurisdiction 
(including over nationals of non-state parties to the relevant treaties), breaching other rules of 
international law and causing further conflict. This risk is a reality, as can be seen, for example, 
by the AU urging its member states to fully take advantage of the “Model National Law on 
Universal Jurisdiction over International Crimes,”412 which itself includes a wide range of crimes, 
and “to use the principle of reciprocity to defend themselves” by indicting non-African state 
officials;413 and the arrest of Lieutenant General Emmanuel Karenzi Karake during an official 
                                                 
410 Supra note 333.  
411 Supra note 380.  
412 Doc. EX.CL/731(XXI)c, adopted by the AU Executive Council at its Twenty-First Ordinary Session, Addis 
Ababa (2012).   
413 E.g., UN GAOR, 68th Sess., 12th mtg., para. 74 (Egypt on behalf of African Group), UN Doc. A/C.6/68/SR.12 
(Oct. 17, 2013); UN GAOR, 69th Sess., 11th mtg., para. 2 (Iran on behalf of NAM), UN Doc. A/C.6/69/SR.11 (Oct. 
15, 2014); UN Doc. A/C.6/69/SR.12, supra note 17, para. 28 (Rwanda). 
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visit in the UK in 2015, which is condemned by the AU as a “blatant” abuse of universal 
jurisdiction and an “attack” on “Africa as a whole.”414  
 Third, the lack of universal jurisdiction state practice raises two important questions. 
First, it is possible to identify the existence of a customary rule of universal jurisdiction? Second, 
to what extent is the support for the concept in the Sixth Committee really political, due to its 
laudable rationalization of fighting impunity, rather than evidencing opinio juris?415 Verbal 
claims in support of universal jurisdiction do not necessarily reflect states’ underlying legal 
convictions and are, in any event, far from uniform. Broad verbal claims appear inconsistent with 
actual state practice. As emphasized by the African Group and reiterated by other delegations, a 
careful analysis of state practice and opinio juris is needed in order to identify the existence of a 
customary rule of universal jurisdiction over a particular crime.416 The lack of state practice 
raises a broader issue. The importance and practical utility of universal jurisdiction may be 
overstated. How can something so rarely applied be called an essential tool in fighting impunity? 
Based on state practice, treaty obligations to extradite or prosecute are of much greater 
importance for preventing impunity. The lack of universal jurisdiction state practice would 
suggest that the concept itself does not work and is in urgent need of revision, especially if 
support for interpreting treaty obligations to extradite or prosecute, which protect vital national 
interests of states, continues to grow.  
Fourth, after seven years of work at the Sixth Committee, the universal jurisdiction topic 
has come no closer to conclusion. Delegations have taken as their starting point that a customary 
                                                 
414 Peace and Security Council, 519th mtg., Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (Jun. 26, 2015), PSC/PR/COMM.(DXIX), 
COMMUNIQUÉ, at www.peaceau.org/en/resource/90-organ-peace-security-council.   
415 Yee, supra note 7, para. 39. 
416 E.g., UN Doc. A/C.6/70/SR.12, supra note 17, paras. 7-9 (South Africa on behalf of African Group); UN Doc. 
A/C.6/70/SR.12, supra note 17, paras. 10 (Trinidad and Tobago on behalf of CARICOM), 23 (Singapore); 90 (UK). 
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rule of universal jurisdiction has historical foundations over piracy on the high seas, which has 
been falsely analogized with numerous other so-called ‘heinous’ crimes and jurisdiction in treaty 
obligations to extradite or prosecute. However, there is no agreement over which crimes 
universal jurisdiction applies other than piracy; 417 and no delegation has been able to identify the 
existence of universal jurisdiction. Second, broad and inaccurate language continues to prevail, 
with a number of delegations referring to extradite or prosecute obligations as “universal 
jurisdiction.” This would suggest that the debate has been wrongly postulated and misguided 
from the beginning because it is premised on historical misconceptions and false analogies.  
As a result, significant disagreement on a number of other fundamental issues has arisen. 
These include which of the sixty or so treaties containing extradite or prosecute obligations, if 
any, establish “universal jurisdiction” and, if so, why; the sources of international law to support 
the applicability of universal jurisdiction over crimes contained in treaties; the definition of 
universal jurisdiction; the crimes, out of a potentially voluminous list, that fall under the scope of 
universal jurisdiction and why; and whether or not the exercise of universal jurisdiction is 
mandatory or permissive. As pointed out by the Chair of the Sixth Committee’s Working Group, 
“[n]o delegation had rejected the concept of universal jurisdiction, but the approaches to its 
meaning, scope and application had been many and varied.”418  
In an effort to “provide a middle ground between the positions of delegations,” the Sixth 
Committee Working Group has recently proposed to two different types of universal jurisdiction: 
universal jurisdiction in custom and “treaty-based forms of universal jurisdiction.”419 However, 
                                                 
417 Several powerful states have doubted universal jurisdiction’s existence in customary international law, e.g., UN 
Doc. A/C.6/69/SR.11, supra note 413, para. 19 (Russia); UN. Doc. A/C.6/71/SR.14, supra note 347, paras. 19 
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the latter type of jurisdiction is not really universal jurisdiction at all, as acknowledged in the 
Working Group’s previous reports.420 As long as some states continue to confuse the relationship 
between universal jurisdiction and treaty-based jurisdiction, then the inability of the Sixth 
Committee to agree on how to move the debate forward will persist.421 
 
 
                                                 
420 E.g., UN Doc. A/C.6/66/SR.17, supra note 418; UN GAOR, 67th Sess., 24th mtg., paras. 22-23 (Working Group 
Chair), UN Doc. A/C.6/67/SR.24 (Nov. 9, 2012). 
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